The Old, Old Problem: Part 1
In an idea so original that four hundred years have not really been enough to understand it fully, the great Dutch-Portuguese philosopher Spinoza, in his last (and incomplete) book inverts traditional political theory. Traditional political theory had rested on the legend of the state of nature. Self-interested parties left that state due to self interest and the desire to protect either their property or life. Nested within this theory, there are in fact two quite different understandings of the state of nature. For those such as Hobbes, who had lived through the anarchy of a civil war, nature equated to endemic war. What was needed to escape this war (or even the fear of it) was a strong leader, be it Cromwell, or for that matter De Gaulle or Thatcher, to lead one beyond the anarchy. The role of such a leader did not involve reason or even ’leadership’, as it is usually understood, but was rather more a matter of providing for a state some arbitrary foundation. The strong leader is the one who invents (and violently supports) a relatively clear set of rules (or prejudices), within which everyone else can then find an existence. Hence one might say, Thatcher became an ‘ism’ not because of the wisdom of any one of her policies, but rather because everyone else (and in particular her political opponents) found themselves constantly caught up in, and responding to, a set of values and arbitrary assumptions, named ‘Thatcherism’.
A second understanding of the state of nature lies within the work of Locke. For him, the state of nature represents the libertarian utopia, so beloved of ‘classical capitalism’. In the state of nature the ‘invisible hand’ of God or destiny or ‘market forces’ was free to allow humans to adjust their behaviour, free from all regulation, and petty intervention. It is this ‘natural ideal’ which all subsequent laws must the foster at all costs. In a stroke, of course, the particular predilections of one particular group in society (the self-interested capitalist) becomes translated into the very stuff of humanity. We all ought to be such capitalists, the refrain goes up, or there is something truly ‘wrong’ with us.
Both these theories blight modern democracy, with their twin, and highly conflicting desires to have both freedom and strong rulers (here perhaps credit ought to be due to Thatcher, who probably more by luck that anything else, managed o define a paradigm uniting these two sets of theories). So much for the conventional wisdom of political economy. Spinoza turns this convention on its head by arguing that it is wrong on four points. Firstly, It is wrong to assume that humans are naturally isolated creatures, On the contrary, he suggests that actually humanity is almost always collective in its nature. There are no isolated individuals in the state of nature. Thence in the modern equivalent, the ‘problem’ with capitalism is that it cannot ever reach its ‘final stage’. No individual is solely a capitalist, they are also always a member of society, a membership which at once pollutes their actions (they arbitrarily favour certain individuals - say, their family), but also articulates the entire situation (without consumers, capitalism is nothing). Therefore, the doctrine of the Free market is as much a definition about what should not be said (the private world of non-capitalism) as what should be said (and therein lies the left’s, or even humanity’s, problem with it…).
Secondly, and far more profoundly, he argues that it is simply a mistake to assume that humanity, when it comes together to form societies, behaves in a way that is exactly the same as it does when individuals are alone. To give another very modern example; It is simply a mistake to infer from the fact that one computer appears really rather good at both keeping records, and communicating with other computers, that one can relatively easily build an entire network of machines, all dedicated to a single purpose, of record keeping and communication. So that it is a mistake to infer from the existence of a single computer terminal in a doctor’s surgery, the possibility of a grand national health computer system. The rules and norms of mass computer behaviour will never be the same as for a single terminal, leading to endless problems and delays…
Thirdly Spinoza argues, the real problem with a state is not that it simply oppresses the people’s freedom, so much as it that becomes obsessed with doing ‘statey things’, in exactly the same way that mass computers start to do ‘computery things’ rather than conveniently behaving as they ought. Thence the problem with statehood is that the most successful (for which read both enduring and expansive) states are often the most oppressive, and least inclined to do anything other than serve their own ‘state’ interests.
Fourthly, and arising from this last point, for Spinoza the very act of forming a society is at once flawed, and yet dynamic. Societies are not formed by individuals wallowing in either an excess of reason or pain; nor do they involve a single social contract signed once and for all. A society is not the product of self-interested reasoners acting to and for their collective advantage; but rather a coming together of multiple, and highly error prone individuals, who are bound up in some way into a state. Moreover it is in the very alchemy of this binding, that ideas which might be individually erroneous, and problematic, become transformed into a vital force. A society is just as likely to be united by its prejudices, and follies as it is by any appeal to reason; And moreover these ‘follies’ cease to be foolish as they perform this function. Society thereby imposes an extra register, where nonsense and blind idiocy, can easily be transmuted into deep and problematic social reality. Moreover the problem of such social realities, is that they stitch together under a single rubric a whole galaxy of different elements. The current ‘migration scare’, gathers up elements of fear about jobs, of racism, of fears about living with globalisation, fear of terrorism, mistrust of others….in a single fetid and yet problematic stew. The problem of course being that in attacking such obnoxious viewpoints one is at once bamboozled, as the target jumps like a flea from prejudice to prejudice; but also frustrated, as in this very hopping about, the prejudice can confirm to others its very relevance.
Spinoza thereby attempts to jolt political economy out of the rut of a juxtaposing of state versus individual; While accepting all the while that a very real tension exists between the two. The problem, he suggests, cannot be solved by favouring one aspect or other – but rather in the creation of states (which are inevitable anyway) that are able to, in doing ‘statey’ things, also allow for individual’s ones. However, Spinoza goes on to suggest that there are three quite distinct ways to understand such an allowance. One might want to conjure up a state around a single paradigm or rubric: the essential fact underlying this rubric might well be nonsense, and yet the collective belief in it will be enough to give a working principle for a state. Alternatively, he suggests one might want to understand a state as a collection of very different rubrics, which can be orchestrated and blended together in some manner. Or again one might want to understand the state in terms of a highly fluid and evolving series of exchanging relations. Spinoza argues that the first type is the true essence of monarchy, the second of aristocracy, and the third of democracy. Arguing very much from the position of his own time, he maintains that each system is unique to a society, and that therefore the role of the political thinker is to concoct the best possible practical solutions for differing societies. From the perspective of our own time, we might well argue that these three different takes on statehood can be just as easily intra-state as inter-state, and that the modern challenge is to understand the problems which each necessary dimension produces, as well as to produce modern possible solutions. As each one of these dimensions (and their application to modern life) clearly almost deserves a Rant of its own, so in the rest of this Rant I will restrict myself to the first of these dimensions - that of monarchy, and will return to the other two next week.
What is it that is so special or odd about a monarchy, Spinoza wonders. It is clearly the case that one particular relation, (in his day, family) had been transfigured into the dominant paradigm of the times. In our day, family has been by and large replaced by two other rubrics, these being the market, and (increasingly) the conversation. It is these two, whose universalisation has become the stuff of the myths spun by modern social commentators (the myth of wealth = happiness, and the global village). For Spinoza, such a system justifies itself. The belief in the power of the market, and of money, is the sole reason for its value. Hence it makes no sense to turn around and ask ‘why does this money have the value it does?’, as the merest asking of that question, has already departed from the system that gave value in the first place. The oddity (and undoubted brilliance) of capitalism is not shown in the credit crunch, so much as in the fact that credit itself is not always crunched! The single-rule system (mon-archy) is moreover, Spinoza suggests, very able to deal with the adversity that it itself produces. Kings were needed to fight kings; or in our day, capital is needed to fight lack of capital and conversation is held up as the answer to lack of communication (‘we need to reach out to these groups’).
However what blighted a monarchy, was the inevitable confusion between the personal interests of, on the one hand the monarch and the state; and on the other hand between the individual citizens and the same state. The monarch would simply lose the ability to tell doing ‘monarchy things’ apart from their own personal advantage. Spinoza, to mediate this problem, suggested an elaborate system of councils, whose role was to ensure, through the medium of the ‘statey’ things that the monarch and their people remain more or less in accord. The second problem though is rather more subtle. Spinoza is aware that there is not only a danger that ‘statey things’ will destroy the individual, but also fears that individuals might well undermine the state themselves. His answer is to ensure on the one hand, that individual self interest is caught up in state interest (no one owns their own property); while on the other, the council depends upon clans in which every individual has a part (and so ‘statey’ things are caught up in family things, and so individuals).
In our day the problem is clearly even more complex. On the one hand we are of course used to the idea that the market invariably does ‘markety’ things (which reflect the interests of certain ’lords of the market’). On the other hand, we simply assume that because in the rule book of the market, it is assumed to represent the interests of individuals, that citizens do not need protection (or should not have it) from the market doing ‘markety things’. Likewise in the case of those lords of chit-chat, the media. We are used to thinking about witch hunts, and aware that the media has a somewhat problematic influence on political life (the chilling ‘it was the Sun that won it!’). And yet then simply assume that the Media doing ‘chit-chatty’ things, is fine, and that the individual needs no protection. Spinoza of course knew better in his time and ours. He would no doubt suggest, that the mere lip service to liberalism (with its accompanying hystericalization of any restriction on market and media) was not itself enough to ensure freedom. For ‘Freedom’ one also needs to ensure the entry points by which individuals enter into trade-y or talky things, actually allow them to share in the axis which these things create. Because it is doubtful where an individual’s right to risk their life savings on the vagaries of the stock market or the ‘viewer’s or listener’s’ right to phone in their opinions (and be often charged for the privilege) comes anywhere close to meeting this last point.
Moreover, Spinoza would be free to argue that there was a very good reason for this failure. Obsessed as we are by the political realities of yesteryear (which are NOW so beautifully tangible and definable), we have defined the entire debate about freedom around defying the power of princes. Media and Market claim to be our friends in such a struggle. The only problem of course is that when the ‘statey’ things have shifted somewhat and are now configured around trading and chit-chatting, these same ‘freedoms’ become agencies for oppression. It is of course probably cynical (though still accurate) to note that the Middle East with its despotisms, and religious democracies serves as a beautiful counterfoil here. We look at these societies, and, seeing them through the prism of our own history, feel smug. And are thereby blind to any hope of seeing what is really occurring (that is, how our own actions contribute to the ‘past world’ which we condemn); But also blind to how, in our case also, things are not as they seem, and how the battles of yesteryear need to be ref(th)ought. (Rethought/refought.)
To think like Spinoza, is to take far more seriously than perhaps normally allowed, the deep problem of what it means to be a part in a society that one cannot do without, and yet which has no necessary interest in protecting individual’s needs. A problem which is moreover compounded, as the state will not simply ‘do statey things’ but also, in the case of the Mono-archy at least, these things will themselves involve the universalization of dimensions which were native to that society irrespective of whether a state was conjured forth from them. Thence the very glue of society is also a personal matter, and can so easily be doing personal things when it ought perhaps to be doing ‘statey’ ones! Therefore to be in a mono-archy (ancient or modern) is to be caught up in a single universal axis, which is at once personal, and yet collective; at once a source of freedom, but also oppression; of participation but also exclusion. The challenge to think such a mono-archy, is twofold; Modern mono-archies are not only not self-evident (they do not announce themselves as such); but also, the rights which one might need to be their citizen are frequently quite undeveloped (and confused with other, often historical debates and battles). It would of course be quite challenge enough to identify such modern mono-archies, and their power. And yet Spinoza has not finished with us yet – for he also considers two other possibilities, both of which haunt modernity in other dimensions, and both of which need to be sung for our times. An argument I will return to next week.
