Waiting a Flo’
How does one understand Florence? Or perhaps I should ask – is Florence merely a cipher? A girl caught in Dicken’s fantasy of unrequited duty? An individual whose excuse must be her youth (and up bringing) – and her self-confessed lack of advisors – and lack of self knowledge. And yet something strange happens with Florence. It is not just through duty that appears excessive, and passivity that is sometimes unbelievable, She remains very engaging but also that her very passivity is not quit what it seems. She might not achieve things directly, but her actions- and even more her image clearly incites much of the action of the novel . This incitement will then take various forms. Florence will clearly open out links between people – who has no connection before. For example, it is when Florence becomes lost as a child that a connection is set up for both Walter, and the Good Mrs. Brown, with Dombey. Or the memory of her links up Cuttles and Toots- creating a fellow feeling between them where one could exist before. But also it is clear that Florence by herself can provoke new and unexpected affects in those she effects. Edith is quite right then to claim that Florence provoked in her feelings which she had never had before – and had never expected to have (590); Likeswise no doubt, one of the ways Florence unconsciously threatens her father is that she constantly threatens to provoke in him an affect that cannot be simply reconciled to his pride( 84)- an affect he almost at one point accepts (587). Finally it is clear that Florence actions somehow defy time. Not only doe she make the past jangle across other times (so her meeting up with the Good Mrs.Brown, and endless disjunctive ramification across the rest of the book -) but also memoirs of both Florence’s action, and how one responded to them to always return to haunt other character in the book (for example her father - 329-935). There although Florence is scarcely ever acts for herself (although it does need to be noted it is she who proposed to Walter 805), she does effortlessly create action (or passion) around around her. But this still leaves open the question how does one understand this process and what Florence is doing? Or even what she is? What is it then that is giving her the ability to act when she appears so incredibly passive?
Or, to put this question in terms of the other chapters in this book, how can we understand the temporality involved in Florence? What tense does Florence – with her apparently ability to straddle times inhabit ? The temporality is in a sense easy enough. Florence operates in the present. Her powers over Edith lie then in her ability to take up Edith’s present- and make it valuable in itself (and to do so in spite of the contempt Edith’s past, which gives that present, has for it) : So it is no wonder that Edith claims that she can have no hope save in Florence alone (590). Nor is it any wonder that her father, (or aunt), both of whom who lacks a present, cannot ever appreciate her (105). And yet she is clearly more than this. She is not just the present in the sense of an eternal Now – in which people are caught – but rather – I will argue below- the present as it is the site of freedom. As such she embodies – various senses in which freedom is always giving within the present – and the apparent choices of the present. Such that she is very much the sense that the present makes one free – or rather opens one up to freedom – a freedom which then implies a time. Nor is she the only character in the novel in perform this role. Harriet Carker – who is clearly another passive – and yet strangely effecting individual – operates (although with a different emphasis) in very similar manner. However before I discuss in detail the nature of these two characters – I need of course to clarify what I am meaning by freedom, and its link to the present.
Philosophy has produced of course very many theories of freedom – not all of which c be applied o Florence. I will then single out five separate accounts of being free that I think peculiarly suite her manner of existing.
Firstly one can argue that one is free in the moment of choice. That in that moment (the Augenblick) all possibilities stretched before one – and one acts in the knowledge that one will be a part of history. The moment then becomes a point of transition- the point when a freedom of possibility – which arises from in the future is realized – and given in the having been. As such it is a moment that freedom is suddenly jolted –or even occluded. What was free because it was possible is no longer free at all- but merely caught in the having been- in history – and among things that are. The present that achieves such a transition – however it might be clear sighted is a present that enacts some kind of loss. Such that to live in this present – and to give the freedom it carries in it – is to carry a certain passivity – a point when one is caught from now on in being passive – in a certain history
The second theory of freedom that is relevant to Florence is Kant – and the Categorical Imperative. It is very much the lodestar of Florence’s life – to follow her Duty – and her Duty is of course to cherish her father. This duty is then the great present that runs through the novel – uniting all character up within it– and forcing – in the final chapter everyone to witness it. The present that embodies such freedom is then the present that as it relates to a higher reality is able to warp everyone else’s being. Such a present is then untimely – in the sense it is always forcing others towards its own time – towards the truth in which they will be held by it.
The Third theory of freedom that involves Florence – goes back to Bergson. Bergson suggest in Matter an Memory that freedom - caught up in delay. Human actions are free as long as they impose a space of time where different options can be considered – and run through. The present of indecision is then the moment when another path could have been chosen. As such it is the point then as opposed to existing in one time – one is open to the past (in general), and able to run ones mind across of pasts – or times in order to choose a course of action. Delay then is not just the point of inaction – but the point then actions are caught up in time – and made to cross relate to other times, and so when (ironically perhaps) the now is lost in the past – for a period of duration.
The Fourth theory of perhaps attributable to Leibniz . Leibniz extends and refines Bergson’s move - to include that freedom that exists after the event. One is not just free in making a choice- but also in giving and re-giving the consequences of that choice. Adam and Eve might live in a Garden, they might even sin – and yet what that sin means – what it continues to mean is not thereby given as such. To be Adam sinning is then not to be one thing – but rather it is to be developing the theme of sinning, and uncovering in all the possibles sins exactly what this sin involves. One is free then after the event – and in the light it casts. One is only utterly damned if one turns ones face on all such possibility and like Beelzebub assume that one is caught it a single event – which brokes no further re-giving. The present is then the moment that will – in later time set one – free – the moment that freedom then re-negoicates, and re-gives across itself.
Finally (and running parrallel to this last move) it might be possible to envisage a freedom that runs in an alternative groove to the present of choice. Maybe what is free in making the choice remains free afterwards – and can be called on – albeit in a different sense after that choice had been made. So that making a choice does not occlude the freedom itself – but rather either eclipses it or augments it; To choose then is to chose to be more or less free – but the freedom – and what freedom is remains the same. This is what all what Spinoza was driving at in Common notions, which he argues involve a freedom that informs all choices, and yet can never be trapped in any one of them– and so is ever present across lives.
In sense these theories of freedom have at their heart an inverse correlation between the power of the present to be free (and that freedom mean something) and the power of the individual to be free. The more powerful the individual is – the more that freedom is thought to be the property then of a single agent, the less then the present has any real freedom within it. However the more that freedom can be thought to put the individual – into question -, the more then it open up the possiblity the there are many individuals, all co-present and acting across times – the more the present comes into her own. The conventional way that individuals understand their own personal freedom – will lay heavy emphasis of the first type of freedom in my list – and will progressively see subsequent types of freedom as really being less and less free as they appear to compromise the individual more and more. Indeed, for such a view of freedom the last two types of being free – failing as they do to stress individuality, will hardly merit the title freedom at all. Liebniz here is a case in point. In Liebniz (as I have misrepresented him above) it is clear it is the event that is free. That is it is the event that is through time evolving different meanings for itself. Such events then appear to preclude of themselves individuality. Liebniz is of course aware of this fact. His answer is that individuality can be saved – if God created a foreknowledge of what would be chosen by all monads – and created the universe in the knowledge of this choosing. Liebniz of course here lays bare the conflict between individaulity and freedom. As one is an individual, an Adam out of all the rest – then one is not free – or at least not in any old universe; and (in contrast) as one is free, then one is free through the event, and open to the possibility that their might exist many possible Adams. This pitching of freedom against individuality is carried most far by Spinoza. For him only the collective is genuinely free – and we are free within it as we act (and know we act) in common. Humans will then conventionally as they think of themselves as agents – arrange themselves the freedom presents – such that they feel themselves more free – the more that freedom is understood in terms of agency – and less free the more freedom is linked to events and commonality. Florencee however gives the lie to this moves. In her self – she embodies a sense of being free in the present – that is not in itself individual (she always wants to be with others) – and therefore whose freedom increases, as her very individuality is put in question. So that she is enslaved when others are free – and free when others might be most enslaved.
In operating in such a manner, Florence is embodying a sense of being free in the present which is not so much pre-individual as ana-individual. That is, it comes into its own – by simply ignoring individuality – and finding its own pitch –its own sense of freedom, irrespective of the people whom surround it. However this move is complicated by the fact that Florence is clearly not the only character making this move. Harriet Carker (who Florence only meets after the main action of the novel is over and in dashes –971) operates in quite a similar manner. As an individual she is caught by her poverty and social position (555) – and yet clearly has a freedom that interlinks her to others, and runs counter to individual freedom (556). However there is a difference between The freedom that Florence gives, and inspires and that Harriet gives. While both obviously enough operate on others as much as themselves – there is a limit to the degree in application of Harriet’s freedom – that there is not for Florence Freedom. Or to put it another way there is far greater poignancy and suffering in the freedom given by Harriet than there is for that given by Florence. Harriet therefore is able to save her brother (John Carker), but only in having but him and her poor together (556). Likewise she is able to save Alice’s soul- but not her life (923). Florence in contrast saves (albeit in different ways) both her father and Edith without necessitating poverty or death in either.. Following the schemata adopted in the other two essay’s it might be said that Harriet – and her freedom is far more self-aware that Florence. Florence’s freedom is more or less explicitly tide to her innocence, and her lack of self awareness –) So for example she fails to realize her beauty in being a women( 804) – while Harriet is clearly very aware of her position – and has actively chosen it (561). So that Harriet is all consciousness – when Florence is all innocence. Here though again it needs to be stressed the paradox in Harriet’s consciousness. She is conscious not as an individual might be – of herself and her action – rather her consciousness is always tied up to being with others – and given across others powers and freedoms. The Link then between Florence and Harriet might be characterized as such. Florence is giving of the pure freedom of the present- a freedom that runs in its own stream and at odds with the freedom of the individual; while Harriet is the consciousness of that freedom – its idea – and is therefore already (in a sense) caught up in being an agent (in part), a move that partially delimits the freedom she can them enjoy. In this rest of this essay I will attempt to illustrate, for m the text the meaning of the above discussion- and to thereby show how both Harriet and Florence present-freedom pertain to a domain which is ana-individual – and whose effective grows, as individuality is abandoned. I will therefore proceed in a discussion of each of the freedom’s identified above, and attempt to demonstrate how they exist (or not) for both Harriet and Florence freedoms – and what follows on from such existence.
In what sense then is Florence caught by individual; freedom? How does such a ‘freedom’ entrap her within its very being free? This entrapment is complex. Not only must consider why it is that the individual fears the present – and what it is that it is fearing, and so trapping. But also the sense that the individual in devaluing the present, will actually express that devaluing through giving the present a certain kind of delimited freedom. In Dombey and Son the classic conflict between the present and the individual is staged between Florence as Dombey. This conflict is made even more marked of course, because Florence is witnessing what Dombey lacks – namey the present. Domeby initially feels ill at ease with the young Florence; she seems to trouble him – and hold some secrete that he denied ; so that he fears he may come to hate her (84). This hatred of course matures in time – as he realizes that Florence can achieve things he cannot – and begins to hate her for it. This hatred then has two quite distinct elements. Firstly he hates her ability to survive in spite of his lack of regard for her. She becomes therefore in his mind the rival, who had the life his son lacked (356). Secondly he resents her ability to win others over her to her – be it his son (328, and 353), or his wife (587,686 and 757). What the man of past and future hates, of the present then is its twin abilities to exist beyond all plans and schemes, thriving when it appears least wanted, and it associated ability to softer, and warp the best of plans – pulling them suddenly in other direction and manner (Dombey’s surprise in Edith’s behaviour to Florence – 587). What the individual man of action hates then in the present- is its very ability to be present, and to win the world in its innocence existence. This hatred in turn leads to the constitution of a double trap for such a present. On the one hand, the present is rendered powerless. Florence has no control over whether she goes or comes, but is forced to endlessly conform to the decisions of others. This demand made on her is either made with brutal directness (she has no control over her being summoned to play with Paul (86,) or over who her new mother is 484); or, is alternatively a little more indirect in its nature; for example she might initially refuses to visit the Skettles, and that refusal itself might be respected (315), and yet then her existence is made so tedious that in the end she agrees to go (398). In all this it is not that she is simply powerless- but rather that her forced acquiescence is always required in the name of someone else (here her father, but Carker is up to the same move). Florence is therefore summoned to play with Paul –only because Mrs. Richards argues that play will aid Pauls development (and so Dombey’s dreams); and not because Dombey has any direct concerns about Florence herself(83), Likewise Dombey only expresses happiness in having her as part of his new life with Edith (507) as she will ornament it (and thereby serve his pride) ( 587).
Moreover the move here is very subtle. It is not just that Florence following the will of another – but rather that her own effects in the process is totally devalued . For Example, when Dombey returns from honeymoon with Edith, Florence provokes in him a moment of vision, wherby he could changed his behaviour to her – and through her to others. His (and Florence) tragedy then being that he views this possible moment of vision in terms of this own personal transformation (and not as a property of Florence). The moment then will not only pass as he changes – but also it will utterly fail to grasp how Florence has the same effect upon others ( Dombey cannot therefore accept how Florence alters Edith). Therefore not only is it demanded that Florence accept another’s whim – but all the power she has to transform is understood in terms of the individual transformed, and not as a property she possess. However this is not to say that Florence is never ‘free’. On the contrary Dombey gives her the freedom of the house – and is at pains to stress that she can go in it where she will (329, and 585) – and yet this freedom accorded to the present is abstract and arbitrary. Florence might be free – but her freedom can do nothing – and can settle nothing, The Present herself is free – as that freedom is worthless and valueless, and will of itself reflect what is not valued by individuals. Individuals then catch presents –and use them for there own purposes. Refusing to give then individual existences – and understanding their effect purely in terms of their own power – and rights. Florence – and Harriet are therefore dismissed – and derided ( Carker claims he has no sister –374), and Domeby banishes his daughter. However it is clear that there still remains and in spite of this attempted at capture an actual power to the present, which defies simple individuality, and remains a worrying, and recurring mystery, which is never quite abandoned : Florence repeatedly occurs to Dombey – when he least wants to think on her –356, while Carker full maintains Harriet’s flower garden, even though he never goes in it (555) and therefore merely its scent is present for him. So that – trapped as it is – in others whim – and thought of merely as it is aiding (or even transforming) others – there remains something intangible and defiant in the present – that is a presentment of another kind of freedom that is already enacting through it.
The Second species of freedom identified above was the Kantain Freedom of the Categorical imperative. That is a rule that one could universally will – in spite of the circumstances - and which thereby frees one from both the current situation – and the burden of individuality in one simple moves. In such a move freedom is essential pulled beyond the individual. Here though it is clear a division need to be made. What is free-in-itself is never the individual but the universal. But of course in itself such a principle is not free – but is rather the product of reason – and the assertion of what ought to be. The imperative then might be said to possess freedom, but is never itself free. It is only the individual who is free – as they come to realise that imperative – and its value for them. Florence therefore is again seen to be operating within an eternal present (of duty) which is definition pitched against individuality – and yet and in the same moved totally removed from the world of action itself. She thereby embodies the freedom that it is up to others to come to experience and value. The essential moral motif of Dombey and son them becomes a pitching of these differing freedoms against one another. That is the pitching of Dombey’s freedoms to make money, and marry (or Edith’s freedom’s to elope) against the Kantain freedom Florence gives. Her triumph then being that in the end – everyone is forced to accept the value of what she gives – and the fact that it alone h th power to make them free (so Dombey is happier in his freedom to be a grandfather at the end of the book, than ever he was to be a father).
Freedom is now then pitched firmly against individuality. And yet – of course it is thereby still caught within the individual. Florence herself – for herself, and as the present is never free. The present is merely valued as it gives something to the individual – as it gives them the secret of the freedom they always already had ( without knowing it). The secret then that Florence threatens her father with when a child ( 86) is the same secrete that Paul says the Waves were always saying (297), and what Dombey finally heard (976) – that is the secrete of a freedom that could be simply caught in time or within the individual – the secret truth of the imperative itself. This secret – is ever present then to individuals (as Florence refused to die), and remains a perpetual rebuke for them (586) that they would be wise to listen to. The defiance that the present issues to the individual – is thereby subtly bought back into the service of the individual . The present is not (and never was) a threat to an individuals being – but merely the voice they should always listen to (ad really was anyway). Florence then in the very moment of her eternal freedom – is caught – and even her defiance, and her abilities to transform her world – is thereby bought back into the individual orbit – and seen to serve there purposes. Florence therefore does certainly give (to individuals) the freedom of the categorical imperative, But, this is a freedom that she herself enjoys (it is her father then the book ends with), and is one realized by everyone else across the course of the book. So that while she is freedom – she remains caught by what is free through her- and not in herself free at all. The first type of freedom them saw Florence either caught by others –who annexed her freedom as their own – or given valueless abstract freedom, a freedom deprived of al meaning. The second type of freedom still then understands the eternal present gives freedom to others –but still would her any freedom of its own.
The third freedom identified above was the freedom of the delay. Bergson suggests that freedom is hollowed out in a temporal delay that the mind establishes between cause and effect.. Within this delay that past is drawn upon – and used to qualify and define exactly what a certain cause if, and what then its effect must be. A very similar theory is f course found in Leibniz, Both suggest that in such a delay it is not simply the reckoning up of alternative strategies that is in play – but far more than this – what are being give and thought upon are different versions of the same individual. Leibniz therefore suggests that as Sextus Tarquinius is considering whether on not to return to Rome – in the foreknowledge that he will be universally hated in after times if he does, is actually reckoning up between different Sextus’s. The present – the period is that which puts the individual into question – that which offer the possibility that time can be re-given – and another quite different person emerge. Florence then is the mistress of delayed memory. This delay operates is two ways. Firstly in her prolonged mediatation about what might- of been .and on different fathers and difference Florence that could be (396) ,and her resolve to study what create a loving heart (398). Such dreaming is for Florence herself clearly ineffective. She is merely trapped in the study of the loving heart – a study that can neither resolves itself (and that in the end which can only posit her own death 426) or escape from fantasy and dreams (487). The delay the present experiences then is virtual, and powerless. And yet – in this very powerlessness in has the ability to transform others. As the very stuff of Florence’s fantasies – and manner of existing – is what naturally in inhabiting a Lebnizian or Bergson delay. That is, she is the giving or reckoning up of other possibilities – other ways to be. At moments of delay- at moments when other possibilities, other individuals can emerge Florence will then swim into conscious. This happens three times for Dombey. In the first, during his meditation on the train, her image is angrily dismissed from his mind (356). However in the other two another Dombey becomes possible. He is therefore is almost reconciled to her the night he returns from honeymoon with Edith (586) –and does actually realize that she alone would have been true to him, after he is bankrupted (935). The structure though in such moments is complex. At these times Dombey does appreciate Florence- and yet of course what he is appreciating is her very virtuality. That is her very ability to be different- and to create another Dombey. He cannot therefore of himself easily leave these moments of delay. He therefore cannot quite say ‘come here Florence’ - and the moment I lost (587) nor can he viewed her as anything other than in the past and would not great her if she was before him ( 938). Florence power this far is great – and yet remains firmly virtual. She has the power to transform – but only as that transformation – is caught within the delay – and as part of the Past (937). Dombey’s response to it then is to think of killing himself. An event which is only stopped by the return of Florence herself – who thereby can offer his a genuine possibility to have another kind of life (940). It is worth noting her though – that it is not Florence herself that allows him to snap out of the illness which follows her rescuing her – so much and Susan Nipper. Up to his calling for Nipper his mind had still wandered(958), and it is only after apologizing to her for dismissing her – and saying that she has right all long, that he is able to actually focus upon Florence – and start to become better (959). That is the delay that Florence imposes upon him is not one that by herself she can free him from (she can merely stop it leading to death – and come to share in it). It is only Nipper – the defiance of the present in the future – that can actually move him (and so Florence) on to the next part of his life.
In this third freedom then – the present of delay suspends individuality – calling into question. I thereby creates zone of indiscernibility where another individual could emerge. And yet in acting in such a manner a double passivity is imposed upon the world. Not only is Florence herself passive – and the delay as she gives it merely dreams. It is therefore always some else’s life that she is transforming- and creating possibility for. In herself she remains the same – and powerless the effect any meaningful transformation upon herself (all that she comes up with is her own death). But also when other eventually do come to express this being – they can only do so passively. Dombey cannot therefore act to escape in her presence alone the delay she has imposed upon him. He is caught in virtuality – and between life and death. The present freedom – is delay cannot then be enough to be free in itself – nor can it create freedom in other individuals to act differently. It merely opens up a locus of difference- into which one tumbles, and cannot (as it is present) emerge.
The fourth sense mentioned above, will attempt to answer this problem. May be Deleuze suggest on Liebniz’s behalf, we have got freedom wrong. Maybe we are as free after an event as be are before it. So that the freedom an event gives us, is not our individual freedom to posit it or not – so much as the perpetual re-giving, and re-structuring of the world that any event in fact gives. Each present might be best thought of as an idea (in the Kantian sense) whose effect is constantly being remade across time. Any one event then exists as a locus of re-forging others through itself. Each event then constantly shifts in meaning – as this remaking is given. Florence then, and even more Harriet- have the gift to never give things absolutely. They are what challenges a simple fixed definition – and what forces others across time to remake the sense that they have been given (and are caught in being given) by certain events. Deleuze then pitches the virtual world of meantime against the world of action. Actions are of the moment. Something happens – as is gone: it is only the meanwhile time of events that takes this happening and gives it meaning. Meanwhile time is then opposed to action as such. Its role is not to be productive- but rather to take up those productions that are, and given them meaning as their existence creates within others productions new implications and possibilities. The present which is significant in this process is no longer the present which actions – but rather the immediate reflection of that action in the virtual. The present being the point of exchange or indiscernibility in which the actual passes into the virtual – while what was virtual becomes actual. Dickens (and possibly Deleuze knows of this) is very careful to position the presents both Harriets and Florence’s ‘being present’ in the virtual side of the mirror. That is they operate as the moment hat an actual has tumbled into a virtual – and has become an event. The present then they are giving – the present of the virtual, is that ideal preset which streams away from th event – endlessly remaking the world as it does so.
It is not then simply that Florence and Harriet are justified in their passivity – but rather that this passivity is the very source and root of their creation. Dickens ensure then is carried even into the moments of high action in the book. So that even when Harriet and Florence are seen to be most active- it is clear that this action is only given by then as it is immediately virtual. For example Walter never actually proposes to Florence. Or does Florence formerly propose to Walter – but rather the entire event operates in the virtual orbit. Walter therefore says he would have proposed to Florence. Florence replies ‘if you take me for your wife, Walter I will love you dearly. If you let me go with you, Walter, I will go to the worlds end without fear’ (805) . The nearest the proposal get to being ‘actual’ is a discussion about Walter’s poverty. Not only in this case does the marriage proposal remain virtual- but also as such it is immediately transforming. Much is made in the text about the way this proposal caught up in – and re-gave the memoirs of their previous encounters (902) - in both changing and enriching them – as it gives itself ( 803). The problem of the previous sense of freedom considered is therefore transformed. The passivity of the present becomes the key element in the very power that present is thought to have. As an action a present would be here momentarily and then forever gone. It is only as it operates in a virtual (and passive) domain that the present can in any sense linger on and be active across myriad other presents.
What is more – as it is virtual, the event is not tied down to having to have happening in the past – and as a past implication alone. As it is virtual – it is equally able to operate across events before it existed as after. And yet here there a complexity immediately apparent. The event as virtual (and Florence as purely virtual) – is independent of any actual present. Yet –the exact effect the event of Florence’s return has upon other events – will be determined by exactly how it is actualized. The same event can have very different effects depending on whether it is actualized or not. Deleuze signals this, of course, by talking of the moment of exchange. At such a moment it is not simply that the virtual passes in the actual (something happens) but the virtual is doing so takes into itself something which had been actual – and virtualizes it (that is makes it matter across other events. For example – Florence’s return home remains at every point fully virtual. Dickens flags this by making the event itself virtual. Florence does not return as an action – but rather her sudden presence is witnessed by Dombey in a mirror (939). She returns then in the virtual – or rather in the tumble into the virtual of the actual at the moment of exchange between the two. However it is this tumble that changes/clarifies what the event of her return will do. Dombey before she appears in the mirror was of course in the grip of her return. And yet he was going to actualize her virtual return as the thought of it upon him, by commiting suicide. The significance of the mirror being that it was going to give him one last moment of exchange. As he actualized his own death – he would virtualizes the image of it – by watching it in the mirror. Florence’s presence then in the glass- suddenly takes him elsewhere- and shifts exactly what that event is. Florence (and Harriet) then exist in this peak of the present –in the moment the actual has passed into the virtual – and is thereby changing everything, This change is as much internal to an event as it triggers a new event. The event of Walter’s marriage (as he had a hope of a hope of it in Boyhood) or Florence’s return – have some kind of virtual existence in their own right long before thy are realized. Florences’ role is then not to create the virtual event itself. But rather to dwell within that events actualization – as the point in the event where what was actual has tumbles into the virtual in the point of exchange between the two. A move that changes everything within the event- and conditions it to move of in new – and quite unexpected directions.
The present has how found some kind of freedom in the event. The present – by which is meant the moment of exchange in which an actual tumbles into the virtual is a moment of freedom. That is a moment an event – even as it is actualized is pulled elsewhere and into another significance that the one it thought it had – a significance which set up an new axis of creation for it. So far all my examples have been drawn from Florence. And yet perhaps it is Harriet who is the exponent of this kind of present. Her very face is said to be ‘ the mirror of truth’ that will contradict what she has said (that is the actualization of the virtual) with a distinct virtualization of the actual of its own (558). Harriet will the takes up a domain in which one virtual is being actualized – and suddenly takes it elsewhere. For example is she who clearly has transformed John Carker – and made his disgrace into a means of redemption (372 and 556). But she shows the same ability at the end of the novel – when Dombey is faced with ruin – and she dedicates the money she ha inherited fro Carker to his use. This move is carefully handled. In conversation with Mr. Morphin (Carker’s deputy) she appears to be caught up in revenge. Morphin reads her then as apparently enjoying the idea that Dombey was ruined – as it actualized a revenge upon him (914). And to Morphin’s surprise – she suddenly switches what this event is about – away from apparently (and actualized) gloating in revenge – to act of redemption - for Dombey and her brother ( 916). The same skill clearly operates in her relationship with Alice. Alice at the end of the novel comes to try to redeem Carker from the revenge she has so carefully constituted for him,(849) And yet such a redemption is no longer possible, and it is not Carker – but Alice herself who is redeemed by this action (920). This redemption – in turn clearly involves over the course of a year Alice being able to thinking her memories – and re-examine who and what she is, and why ( 922), so that she does someone other than she had lived (923)
The fourth sense of freedom then sees a present that operates within a very certain place in the virtual domain. The present is free when in the moment the actual becomes virtual (and the virtual actual). When at the point of exchange- something other than the simple actualization of an event occurs. Something which can (and will) take an event- and move it of in a different direction – and a differing set of possibilities. The present is then no longer the sight of a delay between actions –but rather is that which originally eludes a certain action – and continues to operate in this being elusive – and across its ability to transform another. And yet powerful as this present certainly is – it cannot give the final form of the presents freedom. For in this model it is certain not the present itself which is being free. It is free only as it is caught in events – and as it is what break an event- or perhaps re-nuances it – forcing to somewhere else. This then leaves open the question of whether another present could be possible? One based not on events perhaps, but common notions that operate within presents – and which can transform the world directly in being present in themselves.
The fifth sense of freedom and the present revolve around common notions. Common notions are developed as an idea by Spinoza in Ethics. Here they form what he calls them second type of understanding- which operates between divine intuition and experience. He clearly sees them as akin to reason,. And yet this reason is immanently generated (due to shared elements within the universe) and is not then outside of the domain in which I operates. Such notions are highly complex – but germane to this discussion three point can be clearly elucidated. Firstly common notions are in their name multiple and non-individualistic. This multiplicity occurs in two dimensions. On the one hand not only must a common notion be complex in its own right (it must involve at last two individuals) but also (and by the same logic) it must be understood as something that not only can be understood by another- and actually is being so – even as the notion is given (2/38-39). On the other hand common notions are clearly multiplying in themselves.. That is a common notion changes things – and in changing things adds new difference, and opens out new possibilities in the world (4/). It is this being multiple that will separate out common notion from the constitutive process that give the body ( 2/36). Common notions do not individuals as such, but rather complexify those individuals that are there – moving them off in sudden and unexpected directions.. Secondly Spinoza suggests that with common notion it does not really matter whether one starts with simple notions, and attempt to be more complex- or with complex notions themselves (2/38-39). Indeed the more complex notions that one starts with in a sense the better – as so long as these complexities are shared between two individuals then those individuals will be to achieve more together than if the shared elements were less in number. Useful common notions therefore will then to be already complex- and will be present- and active in being complex . Finally the present that common notions involves it clearly motile. The same present can re-cur across time, and in differing circumstances (5/). Common notions are therefore not events. That is they do not change the world by creating a middle ‘for ‘it – a sense that the world is caught up in itself in changing: But rather operate within the world, and with it – allowing strange connection to recur across it – and thereby opening up new possibilities for a present that can repeat in it.
Edith’s final vision then encapsulate not an event but a common notions. The common notion itself is complex – and its effect even more so. Edith claims then that by loving Florence – Dombey has created not just a common bond with Florence – but also with her (Edith). Each of the elements need to be considered in turn. Firstly it is clear that the common notion that both Edith and Dombey have formed with Florence is the same. Edith therefore says ‘ we have a feeling in common now, that there never was before’ (968). But as she also makes clear this commonality is a true in her past- as it is in his present. Here is then a common notion that is able to free itself – as it is present – from the mere flow of events. It can be present to Edith (in her past) and to Dombey in his present (968) and be so in the same pitch and intensity. Such a common bond in then Edith claims is worth all the sacrifice Dombey has had to pay to achieve it. Again the complexity of what is being thought through by Edith here needs noting. The common bond – that both she and Dombey share with Florence is it itself always transforming. Florence’s power over Edith was to attempt to change her ( Edith) and her power over Dombey is the same. What is common then is the action in which Florence takes up another – and exist with them – and thereby inspires them to change. What has recurred then – is the very sense that the present itself – as it is pitched against the individual is enfreeing – a freedom what involves one tumbling into changing with another (and not merely for another) .
What is more this common bond does not just change the individuals as it is simply present (understood as the Now) . It clearly can operate was it is in the past. Spinoza of course suggests that the past and future as they involve memories of past or future presents will exist in terms of there meaning in the same manner in the mind (3/18s1). What one loved in the past one will as one thinks of the memory itself (and not the passage of time between, which he deals with quite separately –3/18 s2) love again – even if the love will not be of the same intensity as if the thing was actually present (4/9). Likewise Edith will say thinks of herself as part of Florence’s past – (she will have a common bond with Dombey as he thinks of himself as a part of Florence’s present (she goes so far to ask him to think less bitterly of her as she is in Florence’s past – 968). But what is far more than this – it clearly by the end of Edith’s final remarks/ vision – that some sort of redemption in being negotiated through common notions, and within tenses. That is Edith is suggesting that she and Dombey open up a way of rethinking – through their common bond ‘ the dark vision of their married life’. That is – the common bond between them – makes the fact that they married no longer worthless in itself (Edith had begun this conversation is asserting just that – that it would have been better if they had never met –967). On the contrary there time together can now be recast – in terms of an evolving a bond with Florence- that was firstly given to Edith, and then taken over by Dombey. Each can value then the other- and their part in the process- as the revel in this bond. However this of course does not mean that each can ever meet. What is being valued here is not just the common notion – but the temporalilty involved, Edith is valued (by herself and by them) as a part of the past- a part of Dombey and Florence’s past – a part that was caught up in the giving of this bond and caught up as something which had past. A Past no doubt Dombey in the final scene of the book, as he play with little Florence and Little Paul by the sea is actively valuing – and thinking on (as it is of course certain the Edith as she is alive is thinking on it). Common bonds then create a new way to value double tenses – a new way that there existence can be seen to matter- and to be positive in its own right – such that what appeared most dark and problematic – can – through the freedom the present gives – be transformed into something else – into a valuable past – or a valuable present.
I started with a problem. Why do I like Florence so much – when she apparently does so little, and is so passive? My answer has been throughout that this very question is to pitch ones understanding of Florence at the wrong place. Florence is not an individual – nor even a simple individual present – pitch into the world. If then one asserts that freedom is synonymous with individuation – Florence is clearly the least free individual it is imaginable to think. A girl/women who us never free- or it they are it is because the freedom they are being offered is valueless to those who offer it. But to read Florence in such a way is to lose sight of the kind of present she is. Her manner of being present grows – and becomes free the minute that present is pitched against simple individualisation . Her freedom then can be said to grow and grow, as one abandons the notion of the individual – and moves of into increasing collective and complex presents 0 that are not just pre-individual – so much as ana-individual. That is, she is at here most free when one forgets to think about individual altogether –be it in themselves or the forces (or even events) that constitute them. And instead one thinks of a set of parallel process – or common notions- which form an alternative axis to the individual – and creates for itself a present which it gives on a meeting point of freedom and the present- and they are caught within themselves. This then is the meaning of very final vision of the book. The invisible country that the waves always speak of – a country caught up on change and the altering of a heart – a country then that Florence – and her appeal so something other than individuation – hurries one swiftly towards.