Where is the Responsible in Reason?

In a sense, perhaps it is ironic – but one of the very interesting features about Spinoza – the arch rationalist philosopher is that he faced up to the problem of reasons perhaps more honestly than almost any other philosopher. Spinoza had of course deliberately distanced himself from an conception of a rational God, who pre-thought the affairs of the world, and so who could be trusted with forming the mind ( 2/11c). God was for him therefore immanent to creation (1/18) and therefore had to constitute what was reasonable-  what could be thought from within creation itself – without any appeal to a beyond. Spinoza therefore rules as simply inadmissible any jump universal categories such as man or being. The argument here s that such categories cannot be reconicilled with operation of an immanent God, which always operated from within creation, but rather appealed to a transcendental God- which , from a position beyond creation, was able to justify their application (2/40s1).  To appeal to God in this way was, for Spinoza, to appeal to – and to justify, error over truth, and to prefer ignorance over reasons (2/47 s). His problem then (perhaps unique in philosophy) is to account immanently for reasons – and or its ability to form ides that are not mere universals (and therefore the mere image of things – 2/40s1). His solution of course famously – is that humans reasons through forming Common Notions.  He first introduces thought the consideration of two abstract principles. If a particular property, for example relations of motion and rest, is shared by all bodies, all parts and all wholes, then such a property will exist within the body however that body is affected, and t so will be constant in the mind as well (2/38). Alternatively if two individuals affect one another through a property that they share (in both the parts affected, and in the whole), then each individuals will naturally be able to adequately grasp both how there body is being affected, and why the other individual is affecting them in this manner. What is more, as each of these ideas are adequate then must lead necessarily to action (3/3)-  which will itself necessarily in turn lead to further adequate ideas ( 2/40). Such a definition is highly abstract, and potentially problematic, and yet one aspect of it is very clear: Common notions are set against any conception that reasons is singular. This opposition then takes two forms. Firstly, every common notions  both necessarily involves others- and properties that one shares with others-  and also each notion automatically spawns further, both in me, and is the others from which my ability to form those notions originated. Common notions clearly require very many others to exist across. Secondly, common notions  set up an exchange that is very different to that which forms the individual. An individual is formed through the exchange of differences – which are communicated across differing bodies, while remaining distinct from them: The being of an individual remains totally distinct from the being of its parts – 2/13s def. Of individuals, and L4-7, see also 2/19 and 24). In Contrast, in common notion, each difference is directly known in each participating individual equally, and the action is produces is potentially shared by another other of these individuals .  Common notion are then set against both occurring singularly or creating a singularity, and must at each and every turn be thought of as occurring as the very middle of a multitude of moves. And yet this still leaves very much open the question of how one understands common notions at all. One knows why they are important (immanent reason);  what they involve (commonality) what they are comprised of (being in the middle of a change),; and what they are different from (the individual); without quite grasping what they are. The aim of this essay will be to attempt to elucidate this fact.

  One of the curious features about common notions is the fact that Spinoza appears to have four fairly independent expositions of them. He introduces in book 2 – but abstractly, and then returns to then in depth twice in book four (props 19-37, and 60-72 respectively) and once in book five (props1-20). In each of these separate expositions exactly how he uses these notions shifts slightly, as a new aspect for them is developed. In theme 5 of the previous essay I characterized these aspects in terms of the unknown, habit, history and the surprise (respectively). In this essay – I will therefore take each of these topics in turn, proceeding from Habit (4/19-37), to History (4/60-72), to the surprise (5/1-20) and finally the unknown (2/37-40). I am moving in this slightly quixotic fashion as (and as hinted to above) the first time common notions are explored in Ethics is unfortunately the most abstract and problematic giving of them, and therefore should only be tackled once all the occasion have been examine. In each of these topics I will draw a connection between the form of reasons being given, and a character in Bleak House who perhaps best exemplifies and enriches ones understanding of each topic in turn, these character being Esther, Jardyce, Caddy and Allan respectively.  Two things will be immediately noted about this list. Firstly it is undoubtedly the case that each of these characters operates almost exclusively in Esther’s narrative; and secondly I am missing out of it one great exponent of the common notion – namely Bucket. My justification for both of these omission is that Bucket (and in the present where he normally occurs) gives in one all four aspects of common notions, and so as (like Spinoza) I choose to give each aspect separately, I will concentrate on Esther’s narrative, where the distinct versions of topic notions are developed.

Once the comparison with bleak house is made (and maybe totally spinning of this comparison) one of the curious features about Spinoza’s own expositions in Ethics becomes clearly. All the four character mentioned of Bleak house cannot give the common notion they best exemplify without some danger, of falling of from the path of Reason. What is more – what endangers one notion, is actually from another angle a common notions in its own right. Esther (as I will demonstrate below) while giving habit, is stalked by her own history – a history that drives her (and others around her) for fall of from the path of reason, and makes her vulnerable to a subjectoohd that is not her own.. Likewise Jardyce might himself create a sense that reason relates to time- and yet as it does so is vulnerable to what it cannot forecast (such as knowledge of Esther’s mother, a knowledge that leads to Jardyce’s mistake of proposing to Esther): Perhapos one can characterize this over-extension of reasons as an excessive ‘fatherhood’ in which Jardyce is necessarily prone.Or again Caddy might be the doyen of the surprise (even her baby is a surprising) and yet she appears not to be able to give surprises without becoming caught up in the machinations of Turveydrop, and is so to such a degree that she almost makes Esther feel bad about mistrusting him so much (289): Caddy  is thereby caught in an excessive daughterhood. Finally Allan cannot be the master of the unknown without being also vulnerable to surpizes – either which he springs (his attempt to propose to Esther) or he has sprung upon him ( Jardyce building new Bleak house): I might characterize this falling of in terms of a certain problem in bodydom. One needs to develop not just a doctrine of separate common notions, but also be aware of the antinomies associated with each such notion – antinomies that I hope to show- more than register within Spinoza,

Esther: Or Reason Fidgety ways.

Perhaps coming to the idea independently, both Esther and Spinoza cake a very strong  line what is good.  For both – to be could is be understanding, and doing so in a way that transforms what one is. Understanding is therefore not passive, but rather transforms the understander, and makes then in the process ‘Good’.  In Spinoza’s version of the argument the difference between reasons and any other facet of desire is that it strives across adequate ideas. It does not therefore just react to a change by making another change (somewhere else), but rather understands the very nature of what is changing, making a response as an aspect of this very understanding (4/26), with all such responses themselves being adequate ideas (2/40) and so leading to subsequent actions (3/3). Viewed from such a perspective understanding clearly operates on a level distinct from perception (4/1) – existing as it does always between individual impressions (5/7). Or as Esther says at the start of her narrative she has a ‘a noticing way – not a quick way, O no!- a silent way of noticing what passed before me, and thinking I should like to understand it better. I have not, by any means, a quick way of understanding.  When I love a person very tenderly indeed, it seems to brighten’ (14). Understanding therefore occurs not in perception (the quick way), but rather across a relationship (the silent way) – and as a process in which one is caught perpetually desiring to understand; a desire that it itself is caught up in changing the understander into someone who loves. A postiuon Esther summarises  in the   claim ( made to Mrs. Pardiggle) that a true work of charity demands ‘ a delicate knowledge of the heart’, and that the acquisition of this knowledge was both problematic and yet vital to any act of charity, such that without it, it was better to confine acts of charity to those who own truly understood, and only slowly (as understanding grew) expand those activities (91).  Both Spinoza and Esther advocate here the same move to an immanent reason, which gradually emerges across time, which has morality is a necessary partner , and is automatically set against the all too  quick  answers and simple of the transcendental (whose hypocracy is revealed in Pardiggle).

   Understanding will therefore directly transform the individual who understands, and do so in a way that – as they understand they desire (4/26). To understand a thing, and to judge it as good, are therefore the same act-  and I know no more good that in understanding ( 4/27).  Esther ’s goodness then exists not in abstract prescriptions (as her godmother’s does – 14), but rather in understanding, and helping others to understand ( 23). Esther cannot then think of having a maid (and being good to her) without assuming that in meant some education would be involved (289. This belief in the essential goodness of understanding will affect the narrative structure itself. Esther is not content simply to show a sequence of events this indicate that Ada and Richard are falling in love, she also needs to state in formerly, and illustrate how (through her own partical participation in it) it was a common notion (98). Pain or wickedness then lies in not being able to understand (4/27). A principle which Esther takes up in her narrative invariably describing pain either in terms of a failure to understand ( as she does when Allan goes away 203) or (as a pain) not worth describing (she does in the case of her mother presence at the theatre – 503, and   subsequent death – 686).  Nor is this understanding possible alone. Spinoza therefore argues that one only understands  common notion is to be an enriching transformation other individual. But how does one set up this exchange? And can one do it with everyone – or are somethings beyond all understanding? Here again Spinoza’s and Esther’s answers coincide. Spinoza argues that the very ability to be to affect another will of itself imply there must be some commonality-  across which this change is effected ( 4/29). Such a commonality is not a passive ‘sharing’ but rather an active force which runs across all the individuals involved, and through which they are given as existing ( 4/30), and is therefore good in itself (4/31). Spiniza therefore argues that when one is faced with anything disagreeable, and person of reason will respond by rummaging around in their own perception/ mind until they find a point of active contact between themselves and the other. The mere identifying of this point as an adequate thought – separate from all the inadequate thoughts surrounding it, will the (subtly alter the situation). As I think such a thought, and act in terms of my thought, the apparent rival will be helped- and will respond in kind and thereby mitigate (or in luck transform) the conflict (3/43, and 4/46). To strive to form common notions is to strive to find a shared point from which a new (and different relationship can blossom. A point Esther more that concurs with. It is therefore her boast that she always  can find a point of positive contact with children, the only exceptions being the Pardiggle children who were so constrained by there mother (and so outraged by her taking money for them), that they cannot see beyond this unjustice, and uniquely do not respond positively to her (91), torn as they are by some power affect (5/10).

    In General Esther methodlogy might be divisible into two distinct strategies. The first strategy attempts to locate the common notions which underlies an immediate affect. For example, when Allan finally proposes to her ( 703-703), and see, in the name of Jardyce turns him down (703),, she is then very careful to ensure (704) Allan remembers how good Jardyce had been to the pair of them , and therefore to show him both the appropriateness of her own behaviour, but also to inspire him to regard Jardyce on his own account,. Allan responds top this entreaty first by accepting it as a ‘sacred trust’ – and then by agreeing wholeheartedly with them. Esther, the Good Spinozaist thereby transforms what disappointment that could have so easily turned into jealous and hate – into something love (and following the precepts of 4/34s in the process). The Alternative strategy comes into its own when affects involve a mixture of pleasure and pain – so that before on can engage with the common (the pleasure), one must first seperate it out from the pain that appear co-terminus . For example, when Ada and Richard marry, Esther describes herself as experiencing profound feeling of both pleasure and pain (591). Feeling she is very aware she needs to separate and clarify. She therefore carefully notes (and mitigates as far as she can) her own feelings of being bereft of loosing, by claiming that she would be back so frequently that she should hardly thin k it worth it to say good bye. More problematically she also has to seperate the pride  she feels in Ada’s loving Richard though all adversity, and the pity it provoked. She does this on a walk (with Charley), in which she returns to stand outside Richard and Ada’s home, until Vhioles emerges from his office next door. The sight then allows her to precisely locate the pain, and she has a very clear idea of the problems Ada in her new surroundings. Her response this clear idea is then to re-climb the steps of Ada’s and Richard’s lodging to silent kiss their closed (and hearse like) door – (594). Esther thereby manages to distinguish the joy of Ada and Richard’s marriage (their enduring love), from the death that surrounds it.

 

  A common notions is naturally formed within the point of positive contact between individuals. Each notion then will include within it (and as it is posited) only positive elements and if a notion includes (at any level) pain, it will not be common (3/59). Common notions will therefore qualitively include numerous other virtual common notions (that is all less points of agreement between the individuals, all the way down to motion and rest.) . However such a demand for absolute agreement in the fashioning of common notions is potentially problematic – after all it is one of Spinoza’s clearest maxims that a body is constantly changing in its relations of motion and rest .How can one then ensure enough stability to allow for shared feeling to exist? Spinoza’s answer is then habit. Habits have the double advantage. Firstly a habit is a strong image in its own right, one easily able to establish itself across numerous other perceptions and thought ( 5/11-13), so that whatever one is thinking or feeling one can shake oneself back to a certain stable frame of mind (as Esther endlessly shakes her household keys – from p. 81 onwards…) Habit’s therefore prevent one from changing too rapidity, and provide te body/mind with a stability it otherwise need not have. Secondly habit of course are open to other to enter into – and hook up with. Esther’s habit of housekeeping will then open up the possibility that she can form common notions with Caddy, as they learn to value what is good in the habit together (170).

  Moreover these habits, as they are relatable to common notions are not  passive collations of disparate memory, but rather a routine of repeated, and useful (for us) actions ( 4/24025). To follow a routine, is then to allow the imagination to provide impressions for the local and yet useful common notions one is forming with others. If one did not follow a routine, then a very str5angwe problem would emerge.. One might well form a common notion with another-  and be transformed by it – and through it into something else; and yet then discover that ones imagination had not kept pace, and so all ones memory (and therefore all ones previous life) would impel one back to ones untransformed mind. Common notions might therefore necessary to our (and anothers) essence, and therefore as the are common always active in the same way in duration (5/7), and yet (and as ones imagination involve other ideas as well as our own) – still impossible to directly have in the present (this is the implication of 4/ 64 – see below). It is then the role of habit – in which actions are routinely orchestrated, and which can evolve across time, to answer this potential problem. One wonder then that Esther has endlessly fidgety ways and routines across which her live is organized (85 et al). A corollary of habit will then be duty. Duty is the way habits orchestrate themselves as habits within the imagination. It is no  wonder then that both Esther (72) and Buckets staring point to look for common notions is always duty.

    However one needs to be extremely cautious at this point. Spinoza and Esther are  very clear that habit in themselves are not a common notions ( Spinoza calls them images, and Esther disparagingly talks of her ‘fidegety ways). In order to define the common notions underpinning habits one needs to seperate out two aspects of them. At one level, a habit is merely a product of repeat acts of memory, with each act strengthening the previous impression (5/11). This far then a habit is merely a fixed idea – which is itself a product of history (and composed of very many separate times, many memories). On the other there the common notions that is formed across these images – and take up the ‘defiance’ of duration implicit in their very repetition (and repeatability) – and turn it into a positive principle.  Moreover the presence of this positive principle, will then create (and be at one with) a joy ( 4/31) – as the bodies existence is enriched across it.  Hence reason is both  within images (and therefore caught in actual existence) in habit, and yet defies it in a joy (or desire -neither of which is not adequately imagined by the present it relates to). From which it follows that reasons it at odds with ‘duration’.  It is then necessary (2/44), and never simply restricted to one image (5/7)- but rather – as rather will arrange itself across many-  and be perpetually useful (4/35). Reason therefore never operates within memory – but rather straddles contrasting memories, hooking then up together to form new of distinct ideas. This is of course what makes Esther such a problematic narrator. She is never simply content to let an impression stand out alone, but rather always hook it up to some resonance, some common notions elsewhere –or occlude it altogether if it goes nowhere she can see. It is then, when she is very ill, Esther gives the clearest account of this methodlogy as it relates to  memory. She claims that as she was ill all the ‘divisions of time became confused with one another’ – so that she was ‘at once a child, an elder girl, and the little women’ – and perplexed not only be the worries she had at each stage – but the pressing need to reconcile them ( 418). The significant point being not that this vision is somehow different from  her healthy reasoning mind, but rather, that (as she is very ill) that reasoning itself has been suspended, and so all the images that it perpetually ranges across are left juxtaposed one into the other, and feel quite irreconcilable. Moreover it is very clear that Esther muddles up memory from the earliest age, she is after all the girl  who does not tell her Dolly what she had seen but rather what she has ‘noticed’ (14), nor does she think it worth showing the reader gradually Ada’s and Richard’s growing love, but rather states it as a blad fact (98).

    This is also why she has such problems in her account of her blossoming feelings for Allan. The problem her is complex. Firstly she is very aware (as she remembers) all her subsequent life with Allan. She therefore finds it a little difficult to give an account for how they first met, and what it was about him that was interesting her o very much. The memory itself has then become obscured by the common notions that came from it  and so render an account of it problematic. So much so that one gets the feeling she would have been happier introducing Allan much later in the text where the feelings she now has more readily match the memories she has. Secondly, there is her perpetual desire not top engage with the negative thoughts, which means she does not wish to engage with why the knowledge that Allan is going (or his mother presence) makes her so miserable (203 and 355)., as she is painfully aware that not only does misery go nowhere in itself, but also it was needless anyway. Thirdly meeting Allan presented a real challenge to the young Esther, as she wondered if through him (and her feeling for him) she was going to be more like Ada, that Jardyce (174). She is then on meeting him having all sort  of romantic (un Esthery) thoughts which actually do not go anywhere of themselves – as when  she does re-meet with Allan it is (initially) as a friend – with whom she is free again to establish common notions (and not to simply ‘fall in love’. Finally (and seemingly paradoxically given what I have just said), there is actually a real  problem in the way one remembers Allan (as I will discuss in the final part of this essay below) is a man who always gives the sense a common notion engages in the unknown. As such he directly forces one into common notions, and does so immediately, and without first needed a habit. This is why he alone of the single strategies can occur within – and is even  first introduced in the present (120), and also his introduction in Esther narrative is first very indirect (as someone merely present at the family dinner that  preceeded the engagement of Richard and Ada ( 157), and then in speaking (without first being described – 170). Allan is therefore genuinely ‘hard’ to remember (that is bound to one present) because it rather that his spirit  (that his ability to be through common notions) which infuses the common notions Esthet is making  with Richard ( 531), and Ada  (207) and Caddy (174). His presence is therefore not directly located as it is present- but rather in thought of it absence (203), and the gift it leaves on parting (307). Once he has gone then Esther stars to understands her feeling of him as being akin to Ada (although even her she adds the Esthery element in thinking on using the stars to make common notions with him –289) – a romantic feeling that is eventually occulded by her illness, and Jardyce’s proposal ( a point I return to below). It is therefore very much part of Esther’s narrative style that Allan does not figure much in it. He is either (when present) caught up in other common notions) or when absent confused with other romantic thoughts, thoughts that are ultimately aborted,or rather are made to make themselves afresh, and in quite a different way, and so Esther, the narrator of the common notion as it flourishes, does not think them worth accounting for.

  One final aspect of common notions as they are given within habit is their attitude to themselves. Esther very famously, at one point in her Narrative complains that she seems to be writing of herself, when she does not mean to at all (97) Justifying herself with the remark that if one would know what happened to those who were around her, they need know about her to. Here then she is developing one of the apparent paradoxes of common notions. Reason, is for Spinoza both always collective, in that I always discover through reasons what is good for all, and all could do (4/35), and yet always simultaneously self interested, and motivated by the necessities of ones own life ( 4/20).  And so, one cannot be virtuous at all, Spinoza claims without desiring and courting ones own being (4/21). As I am forming common notions, I might be necessarily engaged with others, transforming their life is some way – and yet to be common this transformation must also involve, and the way I am being changed through such an engagement. For Esther to form common notion is others is then for her to endlessly re-discover ways that her essence becomes important to those others, and needs o be accounted for when she is describing them, an how the developed across duration. And yet a sharp distinction needs to be drawn here between Esther necessity to introduce herself in her account of others and simple egotism. It is not that she is indulging in some over regard of some sharply defined (and hypocritical) ego; but rather what she is, and how she and others other are constantly evolving together, and so any account of one needs an account of the other.  This distinction is even more problematic in itself, as it relates mostly to reasons. Imagination (which tends to imagine narrow self advantage) can easily loose sight to it, and assume that somehow it is the self which matters above all other things. Esther is then quite justified top make a point of saying she was not writing of herself alone, and attempting to clarify for us, and for her own imagining, why she has figured so promanently in her own accounts.

The Antinomy of History and the Subject:

Haunting the last two  point made above is the antinomy of subjectood. This antimony comes in the moment a habit looses sight of what it is, and what it roots are in common notions, but rather comes to perceive itself as caught up in giving  subject. But one of the very careful point being developed in Esher’s narrative is that this move does not occur quite where one might have expected it. Esther is, after all, seen from the modern egotist position a relentless busybody, who endlessly interferes in others relationships (and even boasts of this fact to them – 593) – and yet she never seems to get her comeuppance but rather universally beloved This is of course because of the point made above – she does not mistake her own ability to form common notions with others for a simple ego position. She might therefore always be involved with others, and yet never interfere as such – as the always develops common notions with these others, and keeps her own feeling and subjecthood (as the ego understands it) in abeyance. It is not therefore her common notions that drive her into subjecthood, but rather her history. The way that history creates from habit an antimony of subjects needs to be carefully examined.

   This basic underlying problem here is very simple. Spinoza argues (2/35) that truth by itself is not enough to rid the mind of imagination of certain erroneous impressions. This is because such impression are not based on any real property of an external being, but rather arise the affect of this another upon an individuals body. This effect then being something real (and positive) in itself, and so not removed by any knowledge about what the external being is actually like (4/1s). One might therefore know that the sun is far removed from the earth (and is never presence in puddles of water), and yet this does not stop us feeling its effect upon us as if it were close to us, more us seeing its reflection in water, as if it were really the sun. Imagination, which is based upon the effect others have upon my body is naturally antinomous – that is it is forever creating within us false knowledge- or rather knowledge which is not of itself false, and yet is not quite what it would seem to be. This problem must then be all the more intense when one cones to the issue of habits. The Imagination will not of itself know of the common notions that are giving the habits, but rather see them in terms only of the affection of its body, whose strength  lies not in reasons but history (this by 5/11). One might say therefore for imaginations habits are merely the expression of a history. However, it I easy enough to envisage a second antinomy – which would arise in imagination once a habit has been broken. Any common notions (as a force) will have a finite effect (4/3) – is perfectly possible therefore for the mind to be torn by others to such an extent that a certain common notions can no longer be imagines in the present (5/10, and 4/33). This will then present the imagination with a new situation. The common notions itself will feel as true as ever, as it remains necessary (5/7), and yet it will be unable to create a set of imagining in the present that will directly express this truth. Imagination will therefore locate this common notions as being true at some other time(by 4/9), and relate it to past or future existences.  A Reality, which consciousness as it exists in all the minds actions, will then confirm. Common notions will then paradoxically fall into time, and become only thinkable by a certain subject in terms of their own individual history. Nor is this all – a third antinomy is clearly possible if (for what ever reasons) one privileges imagination over reason – and supports that privileging with sufficient power. If ones acts then against reasons, and values as a subject, the various passions with which one is torn (4/34), then reason, which of itself eludes both history and habit, can easily appear valueless – and be derided. Here then are the three potential antinomies of history and the subject and he individual associated with it: The antinomy of personal history, which locates a common notions at a time and place; the Antinomy of world history, an values habits by the longevity; and the Antinomy of no history, which only values subjects by their pedigree.  I will develop each point in turn, taking again my reference points from Bleak House.

The Antinomy of Personal History:

Spinoza claims that humans disagree and are in constant flux only as they are subject to external influence – and passion (4/33). It is only as I am in  a passion that I can be set up against myself, and made to differ from my own nature. And yet, as just mentioned, consciousness of itself (as the idea of an idea) will equally present in passion – and in action. Every individual will then have the experience of at one time feeling that certain common notions were both true and active (powerful) across every time and yet then (as they are subsequently torn by some powerful contrary affect), not being able to fully give the nature of that power, and in spite of the fact that it was still as intense to them as it always was (5/7).  Consciousness (and imaginations) response to this problem is to create for itself a personal history – across which this apparent dilemma can be reconciled. This personal history is complex, and can have several stages. For example through the character of Esther and her emergent love for Allan, Dickens carefully identifies vaious stages to this process – stages I will now turn to.

The first stages of Esther Love – involves the forming of common notions with the unknown . Allan is therefore singled out almost by his absence – and his being an addendum to the main action, whose words are never recorded (and this in spite of the fact we learn latter he is coming often, and is a great favourite with Jardyce –354). I have (in terms of common notions) justified the nature to this ambivalence above. As a man of common notions Allan is not easily accountable – and known more in his effects (or his absences) than directly in his presence – and Esther’s account reflects this fact. Allan then really comes to the fore through his absence. This absence will occasion both sorrow for Esther, which she does not care to account for (203), and inspire her to directly identify herself as a ‘lover’ and therefore as in a sense the same as Caddy or Ada (209).  But what is important in this love to lover – is the way that imagination is attempting to reconcile an apparent paradox. The intensity of the common notions which Esther formed with Allan will not lesson in time (5/7) – and yet  these notions cannot be directly expressed in habit (or in anything else). They are then bound up in a memory of a certain set of events, and a hope which would follow on from that memory. Esther says therefore had thought that Allan had loved her – and that he would return to propose to her ( 429). And yet the giving  of such a hope (and the memory associated with it) itself involves a degree of falsity (4/47) in its expression.  Imagination – even as it is giving a common notions which (for it) pertains to another time, is warping it – and catching it up with concerns of its own. The Common notion Esther has made with Allan become then caught in a certain personal history – and an assumption of what will follow from that personal history. When Esther’s body is changed (by illness), she will then feel her rights to keep this personal history in her presence (as a hope) are vanished – and she will move it of into her past. She does this by wrapping up all the intensity of the notions, in a single vision – of Allan’s rescuing many in a ship wreck, and so feels her love for him (and he common notions that underpin that love) are merely an expression of the wider love everyone should feel of him on hearing the story of the ship wreck (428). She therefore misinterpret Miss Flite’s remark that Allan needed a title for what he has done. Miss. Flite thinks that Esther (who she thinks of as a Jardyce) should confer one on him by marrying him, while Esther is only thinking of the wider (and common) thankfulness everyone else should feel.

   Esther ‘s move here is potentially disastrous. In her imagination she has translated an impression of a specific set of developing common notions established between Allan and herself (and experienced as love), with a far more general set of notions which would see Allan equally valued by everyone, and therefore understand her own love for him as merely a particular case of a more universal love everyone should feel and learning his worth. She thereby moves Allan off into her personal past- a past which she has forced to be distinct from the common notions that had actively been a part of it – but which she has now abandoned to the universal, and which she cannot think of without some pain – a pain (and a pride) which she associates with the flowers she keeps). Such a move would – if it had been left to continue of itself no doubt blighted her future relations with Allan. He would attempt to form sacred trusts with her (that is specific common notions) and she would have been faced with the dilemma of either insisting that these were more generalised notions (which would itself involve pain -4/65); or, feel that such notions were themselves painful, as they caught her in remembering the hope she had abandoned. The problem then is that she cannot be free to feel for Allan as long as those feelings are associated with a positive (but abstract) imagination of this worth, and a private grief associated with this imagination – and yet treasured as part of that universal love – as her dried flowers are still treasured. Jardyce subsequent proposal then shatter this position, as she no longer feels that she should value the memory so highly – so she burns the flowers (after retuning the dream of Romance to Ada’s lips, from which it originally came –521). Allan s then free to return (which he duly does in he next chapter) and she is free again to make specific common notions with him. Her past thoughts of him then become merely a troublesome memory- and not something to be treasured in its own right (701). When Allan subsequently does propose to her (702),  she is then genuinely surprised, as she had seen only the common notions she had been making with him in the interests of Caddy and Richard.

  Her subsequent reaction is then interesting – in two ways. Firstly, it leads (on a personal level) to a mediation upon the common notions she had already formed with Jardyce- notions that certainly involve Allan within them (704-705). Her response to this mediation is to pick flowers of her own – and yet (in the eyes of Jardyce) to be brighter than any flower (705). The symbolism is then clear here – from the mediation upon common notions she comes to understand the correct relatinship between common notions and love. Namely one does not form common notions because one loves, but rather loves because one forms common notions. One can pick therefore flowers – and love, and the notions themselves are being made. And yet there is a second register at play. Jardyce is aware of a final problem that common notions, which base themselves within habit, involve. Such notions will invariably pitch themselves within the habits that they have- and the interests that arise from these habits, and not therefore attempt to move beyond them. Esther will not then follow her love for Allan (and the potential common notions that flow from it - 723). She might then be master of her own love, and yet still not master of her own history, and the habit that has followed from that history. It therefore takes Jardyce to shatter that history – and free habit from it (which he does directly after Allan’s refused proposal). What is more, he of course does this by setting a habit which is ‘freed’ from history that is a parallel Bleak House, which embodies many of Esther’s Fidgety ways (722).  Imagination, which appeals to a different register than common notions, will endlessly create snares for them – dragging, through the medium of duration, an individual into endless shifting realties, where what common is lost is the merely historical and habit forming. Reason (as it operates across habits), is therefore endlessly at risk from its own imaginations. These imaginations will either see habitual reason trapped in the wrong place (time / habit); or  divorced (though history – that is fluxes that has been) from its true implications, and so caught in a perpetuating antinomy from which it cannot of itself escape.

The Antinomy of Impersonal History:

Spinoza suggests that humans, as they are subject to passions cannot agree with one another, as passions involve lack, and nothing agrees with another through lack alone (4/32).  From which it must surely follow that habits –whose strength lies not in the event in itself, but its repetition, is (as it occurs within imagination) rooted in a species of lack – and so therefore both passionate and problematic in its nature. So that, to value a habit for itself, is to value something is lost and never present- or rather is present only in history- and across the past. However it of course also follows that this past is something passionate in itself. it is therefore not something to be shared with others, but rather relates to the very specific habits across which it was arranged – and which will have to furiously defend it, in order that they remain habits in themselves. Habits then thrive as they are allowed to set up passionate and exclusive history – from which exalted position they regard habit without such a pedigree as somehow suspicious and  beneath their notice.

Or to put the above in another way – habits must surely take on the character of Allan’s mother.  She embodies six distinctive dimension of a habit which has been left to justify itself within imagination. Firstly, a habit must regard itself, and its history as both valuable and exclusive in itself. Mrs Woodcourt therefore argues that  Allan’s royal welsh heritage is worth more than beauty or money (207), and so demands that he finds a wife exclusively from a family  with a history of its own  (353). Secondly, and following on from this point, habit will claim value not be intrinsic worth (as they are passions) but rather through their history itself. Habits then which involves greater age – and have been established across succeeding generation as therefore of more value than ones of more recent construction. Allan’s mother therefore clearly believes that noting Esther could do could make her worthy of Allan, and would have continued to belief so if she had not been challenge to think the opposite by Jardyce (723) Thirdly, and as habit involves its a passion, it does not actually matter what the habit itself relates to . For Mrs Woodcourt, the habit of remembering her decent from long dead royal welsh forbear is justification enough to confer distinction (353), and do this in spite of the fact that his only claim to fame was (according to Esther) to be violent, and then to be praised (by another) for that violence (206-207).

  Fourthly, and a little more complexly, a habit will naturally fail to adequate appreciate anything other than habits. Mrs Woodcourt cannot therefore grasp that Esther could have come to any sort of knowledge of knowledge of Allan – due to the short time she knew him (353). Nor can she value the more general relations that Allan has made with others –which appear to her , with her demand for long-established habits, to be flighty and trivial (354). Fifthly, no habit can move beyond a current set of habits. The Fortune that Mrs. Woodcourt tells to Esther is then that her current habit will continue-  and become more intense- through her marriage to a richer and older man (355). Finally habit poses a real problem of perception for reasons as it operates across the habitual. Esther one level Esther recognises the value of Mrs. Woodcourt and her endless habit forming ways, and thinks of then in terms of the innoncent habits she herself forms. But one another level, Esther suspect that Mrs. Woodcourt habit are not what they seem, and that she is not to be trusted or confided in (355) . Esther problem her is of course actually a very profound one. Not only does she value Mrs. Woodcourt’s habits; but also, to formalize the passion that underpins them (and which arranges them against her) would be for her to formalize a pain as a hatred (3/13s) which she of course, as an Esther of Reason rejects (as hatred is never good –4 /45). She prefers therefore instead to state that she does not understand her feeling for Mrs. Woodcourt – or at least does not think them worth understanding (352).

The very use of habit is therefore problematic for reason. There can (for Spinoza) never by anything in reason itself which can prick the pretences of imagination to create a world of itself own. This world will not only follow its own rhythm – but there is theoretically nothing stopping that rhythm setting itself up against the very reason that informed its constitution. Indeed one might go so far as to say that it must inevitably make such a move. What imagination actively values in itself, and in habit will remain essentially a passion (one rooted in history), and therefore always of itself opposed to and struggling against reasons. This is of course not to say that it will always master reason (which has many ruses and stratagems of its own) but only that the potential conflict must always be born in mind.

The Antinomy of Eluded History

Buried within Scholium of 4/34 is a strange observation. Spinoza gives the  example of two men who are rivals in love, and so agree in the fact they love the same object – and yet hate one another. How is it Spinoza asks that two people who agree about what they love still hate one another? His answer is that as they agree why do not hate each other (and indeed their passions are increased). The Hatred spring not from agreement but rather from disagreement, that is from the fact that both cannot enjoy the thing loved at once. Two corollaries must then surely follow from such an explication (neither of which however Spinoza draws). Firstly it just follow that those who actually agree about the most are potentially those who are prone to the most violent of conflicts, as well as the most intense of common notions. Secondly, the exact nature of this common element will endlessly elude such individuals, for whom it can serve to further provoke their hatred (at it reminds them of what they have lost or what they could loose). From which it in turn follows anything that embodies a potential for common notions which have not yet been established, is in a perilous situation. It might of course aid the establishment of common bonds, and be beloved as what transformed the situation. But it could just as equally be hated-  as the link between disparate people, which if only it could be severed once and for all could lead to the cessation of all conflict.

  This is of course precisely situation in the world as an illegitimate child, whose birth very birth served discord between Lady Dedlock and her sister who otherwise nature agreed in so much, as well as separating Boythorn from the women (the sister) he loved (515). So that one can clearly see why that sister (Esther’s guardian) claimed that Esther, the illegimate common accord, was her mother’s disgrace, while her mother was her’s ( 16): A disgrace that makes their very physical resemblance something dangerous (349). This then is clearly what Jardyce fears: it would, after all be so much easier , so society as a whole to marginalize – or even eradicate Esther than to appreciate her value. It is then to protect her from such risks that he proposed to her, so that in being the mistress of Bleak House, she can gain an unimpeachable legitimacy she might otherwise lack (517). Here of course he commits (and very soon knows that he commits) an error (722), but in a sense how could he do anything else? After all how does one protect an common notions from the consequences of its illegitimate commonality without erring in someway? It is of course then to Jardyce’s credit that he recognized the error, and when it no longer becomes necessary happily renounces it (ibid)

  A common notion called Esther, gives  both an antonym of reasons – and  the mind of the Esther of Reason, but also an antinomy that stalks this reasons. Esther is reasonable as she has she engages the world in habit, and the activities that are inspired by those habits – these are then her fidgety ways. Ways the place here in the notice of her own narrative however much she might try to occlude herself in the name of modesty.  And yet this reason is haunted by a past. This haunting being essential to Esther’s reasons itself. And is so in two distinct senses. Firstly, her common notions inspire her imagination to create images (of the subject) which then betray that reason. Secondly her reason is always internal to the habits she has – and therefore vulnerable to the vagaries across which habits have been formed. Indeed such is the profundity of antinomy that the very solution she thinks she has provided for the problems bequeathed her by imagination ( of presonal history, habitual history, and no history) in fact is only possible because in making it he is propelled into the second aspect of her antinomy-  the fact that her reasons is internal to her own habits. She can then only escape the past – by being caught subtly anew in it, and insisting that duty (and habit) decrees that she marries Jardyce, and not Allan. Or perhaps one could say that this personal resolution of her own history – is in a sense not only  external to, and imperceptible for her – as it is of course just this moment that catches her up in another quite distinct and external history – one that does  see her eventually being mistress of Bleak house, but as Allan’s wife, and not Jardyce’s. Esther therefore cannot escape her own antinomy – and the best she can hope for is that at another level a different way of reasoning can step in, and rethink the history she is part of, and do so even was Esther herself thinks that she has found her own entrapping resolution. It is then to this next form of reasoning I will turn.

Jardyce – Benevolent Time

Right at the end of book four of Ethics Spinoza has a strange meditation on the issue of reasons and time. What is strange her is that after arguing for pretty well most of the rest of Ethics that Reason and time have nothing to do with one another (see 2/44), he suddenly asks – what would reason look like if it was related to time?  What other realties would reasons impose upon temporality. Now Spinoza in asking this question deliberately queries its status. So that he in one breadth develops a doctrine of being reasonable in time – and yet simultaneously undermines his own argument, and does so by questioning both is empirical possibility (4/62s) and is ontological status (4/68).  So that the reader is left wondering what on earth is happening in this strange consideration of reasons in time. For me, I think the clue to understanding Spinoza on this point comes from scholium which follows on from his questioning of the ontological status of temporal reason. In the proposition he has just argues that a man of reasons does not form ideas of Good and Evil – as long as he is free (4/68), and therefore, by implication all the his consideration on Good and Evil  (in which his consideration of time is framed) is questionable. And yet in the scholium he turns around and says – that this is actually the wrong way around. It is not that good and evil (and time) are wrong – but rather a man whom is able to act by reasons alone. Given the very particular nature of God sive Nature (4/4) it is impossible that a man can be determined by his own reasons (nature) alone.  The profundity of this problem is hard to exaggerate. It is not just that reason as a force is surrounded by forces that are somehow greater than it is, but rather that the very condition that allow reasons to exist-  the bodily realities that fashion its nature bind into a world in a way that it cannot control or affect. The reasoning individual therefore must find themselves already in a body, and already acting to be reasonable at all ; Reason therefore even as it has immanent existence is necessarily, and as the price for that existence surrounded by inadequate ideas (4/2). This was of course the Esther Antinomy. From which it of course follows that reasons  lurches into a world which endlessly surrounds it with places and times that it is not – and yet across which it must (while remaining reasons) orchestrate some kind of existence. How then can reasons remain reasonable even as it is bound to what it is not? And how does this reasonableness itself exist within the unreasoning flux of duration?

  In answering the last two points, Spinoza effectively argues that one needs to comprehend that reasons operates with duration is a way very different from inadequate ideas. Inadequate ideas not only endlessly fluctuate across time, but their very intensity changes with this fluctuation. What seems so strong an affect in the present – will, as it slips into the past seem weak and ineffective ( 4/9) The same is of course not true for reason. Common notions, as they relate to human nature remain equally intense across times (5/7), and are always viewed with the same certainty (4/62). The argument here is actually very complex (in spite of the speed Spinoza moves with). If Reason, he suggests (in the Scholium) could know the duration of things, it would invariably treat both future and present with the same intensity – and desire a good in the future as much as it desires a good in the present. The complexity lies in thinking just what it is that Spinoza is proposing here. What he is suggesting is that if it were possible for Reason to extend it conceptions beyond its own nature – and into the nature of others, so that it could conceive both how they come into existence, and how that existence then affect us, then it would will things in its own nature differently (and irrespective of duration). The paradoxically nature then of reason thinking duration lies in the fact that to order think  duration reason must, and by definition, be  attempting to move beyond its own nature and into the of others; it must be doing so of course, because if it remained within its own nature, it would not produce a conception of duration at all, as everything would remain equally present for it (5/7). Duration therefore involves reasons is a strange ‘second guess’ of others. And yet – the strangeness of this second guess is even more profound when of course one remembers that common notions, not only always involve two or more distinct individuals, but also that as a form such notion the depth of this commonality is enriched. Reason is therefore necessarily set up against duration (as it involves it in the antinomy of thinking which is unknowable to it as it reasons), and yet – at the same time – it is the very ability to grasp at common ideas that forms the essence of reasons itself.

   Hence, there are two clearly different attitudes to being across tenses. Inadequate desire change both their intensity, and their nature as they move from present to past (or futures); and as they are associated sometimes with other desires, or not; and as these desire reach their partial or complete fruition; and finally as the body in striving itself changes.  Desire that arise from inadequate ideas, therefore endlessly mutate and change as they are given, and thereby spawn endless new tenses across which they are arranged.  A fact that leads Spinoza to remark that there are as many species of differing affects, as there are ways to be affected (3/56). The same is clearly not true for desires of reasons. The problem for such desires is not that they mutate across tenses, but rather that they are necessarily fragmented by them. A desire can all too easily relate then not to what is present – but what is in the future. If this occurs the mere presence of this desire will no doubt aid its realization within the present, and yet it cannot of course of itself guarantee it.

    The problem will then be further complicated by this lack of guarantee,  in three ways. Firstly, it will undermine reasons ability to guide behaviour – as it the end reasons of itself cannot guarantee the rewards it hypothesises will result from behaving in a reasonable way. One cannot therefore simply follow reasons guidance alone, but will always be open to the endlessly mutating world of tense, which will threaten to destabilise our most reasoning of actions. Spinoza therefore is very careful in his language, as he talks about following the guidance of reasons. One can he is arguing follow this guidance, and in a sense one must – and yet one will always oscillate between it and the alternative inadequate position. ( 4/62 says ‘insofar as the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason). Secondly Common notions cannot be generated within two differing individuals without sparking of new imaginations of their own – which attempt to directly inhabit the future that reasons knows itself to be (that is for Spinoza, without creating universals – 4/62s). The desires that flow from these imagining will of course affect greatly the sense in which that future exists – and quite possibly undermining it entirely.. Thirdly Reason, of course cannot actually grasp at the duration in which it adheres, all it can do is  merely thinks of it as if it were reasonable. The ideas then it produces are therefore (4/62 s) abstracts sive universals, and not common notions. That is they involve no actual engagement with the circumstances, but  only the representations made within an imagination driven (and as that imagination represents durations) to give to very many separate impressions in a single abstract image (2/40s1)

   What then does this fragment of reason look like? Esther, gives a perfect account of one. One evening that she and Richard and Ada have first arrived in Bleak House, she and Jardyce look on as Ada pays the piano, and Richard stands by her side. Esther says in the merging of Richard and Ada’s shadow by the uncertain fire light, but also in the music and the wind, Esther as a ‘little clue afforded…by the present’ of the ‘mysteries of he future’ (64). What is more she associated this clue with a certain benign expression of Jardyce, through which she both reads Jardyce desire that they should marry, as well as a feeling of certainty that they would.  And yet, of course, indirectly it this look that undermines much of what is positive in Jardyce’s hope.  Esther assumes that Jardyce simply wants Richard and Ada to marry, and starts to form common notions (and habits) accordingly, they therefore become engages long before he meant them to (his first reaction on being told is the single word ‘Already!’ – 154) . It is then the precipitance of this engagement in turn makes Jardyce place the condition upon Richard that he sticks to his new career (155), a move that of course eventually (and two careers later) lead to Jardyce demands that the engagement should be broken off (290) and prefigures Richard’s setting himself up against Jardyce in the Jardyce case (421/449). And yet – and in spite of all the trail of calamities that certainly follow that glance, it does not stop Jardyce thinking their eventual marriage was not bad of itself – and was more an occasion for pitying its circumstance than anger at its occurrence (594).  Individual fragments of reasons are therefore far from a passive. Future, which merely lie around waiting to be. There very conceptions creates indirectly, and in the imagination , an inadequate desire that they should be – a desire of dubious effect. However it is also clear that as reason is necessarily adequate it is to active, and that therefore reason will be directly acting, and as it exists at all, upon the inadequate world in some manner, and to some effect. These effects I will characterize as involving either recasting or implosion.

  Recasting relates back to the position of reason within duration (or more properly within the future). Reason always both understands, and arranges duration in the interests of the common notions its gives. Its cannot look therefore on the not reasonable, so much as the not yet as reasonable (as it could be), upon which premise it therefore acts.  Reason will,  thereby ‘relativise’ the world of perceptive affects,  according to whether they aid its understanding or not. It will therefore choose the greater of two good, and the lesser of two evils ( 4/65), and do so irrespective of whether the greater good is present, or to come(4/66).   However (and Spinoza never looses sight of this fact) as it makes this judgement reason is not engaging with what actually is but merely comparing the relative states of its ability to for common notions across time. Such a compassion therefore does not relate to an actual existence in the world, and is therefore necessarily abstract (hence Spinoza’s use of the word comparison in 4/65 and 4/66, which is always a negative word for him – 3/gen. Def, of affect).

   In a sense then it is actually reason that is operating here to create a duration for itself to exist within. This is because it is reason that works upon myriad shifting tense relations (and so irrespective of actual existence), arranging them as a progression, across which it constantly attempts to enlarge its overall domain of common notions. Or perhaps one could this species of duration is inevitable once reason is understood is terms of a constant (and enriching) activity (and therefore one that is always developing of itself –i.e. is always adequate cause it itself–3/1). And yet, at the same time allow that reason to be located within  and delimited by numerous things that it has not (yet) comprehended within itself , and yet which it may,(and knows it may), if only the circumstances are right. In recasting the world, in terms of a certain species of duration, reason merely lends to existence the light of perpetual development through which it operates, seeing ti then not in terms of what is actually existing or not, but rather how what is being thought is enriching its creative power (or not).

  It is again Jardyce in Bleak House who perhaps embodies this simple belief of reason world can be thought according to its modus operandi. Jardyce response therefore on being told of Richard and Ada’s engagement is very telling.  First to ensures that Richard knows that the prospect of the their marriage is far off (and so removed to the future). He then attempts to inspire Richard to ensure that all the rest of his life he behaves with the same constancy as he feels for Ada (155) – so that through determined effort (and across duration) he (Richard) can create the circumstance to make Ada happy (156).  Her then, and very clearly Jardyce attempt to ensure  from a developing  common notions (Richard’s Love for Ada) a whole set of criteria emerge to ensure that that notions has its maximum possible effect.  It is then this duration that justifies one puts up with inconveniences in the present, in the name of some future goal, something of course Jardyce merely hopes will be the case to Esther (155), and tragically enough is not.

   Reason therefore effortless reacts tense into a species of progressive duration, and yet it can (in another guise) disrupt the very progression that it apparently labours so hard to create. This eruptive is of course intergral to common notions themselves (which are always developing and changing) and doing so even as they attempt to create nice little durations to grow across, within the world. Reasons, therefore as it operates on what is not reasonable does not fix forever the catagories of what is good and what is evil – but must remain always open to he possibility that a greater good can emerge and replace a lesser (this by 4/66). Reason therefore both creates itself a duration, and yet then constantly and of itself disrupts that duration, and pulls it other than where it thought it was going . It therefore operates very much like Jardyce, who no doubt proposed to Esther with the best of intentions, and yet soon not only doubts whether is right that he should have done so, a doubt which turns to certainty when he sees the common notions blossoming between Esther and Allan (and to a degree himself –722). He therefore accordingly realizes that his own common notions are best served by ensuring that Allan and Esther marry under the most favourable of circumstances – and arranges matter accordingly ( 723-724. He even goes so far as to ask Esther for forgiveness for causing her pain, for being the lesser of two goods (ibid). 

And yet there is something very oddly sinister about the ‘guidance of reason’ (and for that matter Jardyce). Reason will be invariably operating – as it judges what it good and what is evil, in its own interest and ultimately according to human nature- that is, according to its desire to form common notions. As such it has no conception that what it is dealing with might be of an utterly different nature to its own – and therefore unable (or unwilling) to form common notions with it.  Hence, Spinoza argues, that one should only follow reasons guide in the case of other humans, who share in the same nature, and not animals who do not (4/37 s1). The point being not (as it infamously was for Descarte) that animals have no sensations even that one cannot to a limited degree form isolated common notions within them; but rather that the instant one moves beyond these common notions, and into the more general domain of the ‘guidance’ of reason’, reason will (and whether one likes it or not) operate according to human rhythms, and hence loose sight of what the animal actually is. It is therefore for Spinoza better to accept this lack of common bond, and leave it at that (so treat animals as power in there own right, over which we have power). In a sense therefore one might say that the guidance of reason is sinister in its very benevolence. This benevolence is firmly after something, and is always going somewhere (even if this somewhere is ones actually in he interests of all parties involved)  Richard is not then utterly wrong to suspecting Jardyce’s motives.  He is right that Jardyce is out to change him,  and is always working to subtly manipulate him into abandoning the case; all he is actually wrong about is that he fails to see how such a course of action is actually in his own interest (449). Moreover if reason cannot establish meaningful links with other natures, it has only two options – withdrawl or violence. Spinoza will therefore argue that one cannot truly engage with animals interests, and therefore should not think of them, and therefore only use animals as they serve human purposes (4/37 s1). Jardyce, of course, rejects the latter option, or rather combines it with the former. He has one room – the Growlery, where he is both violent and yet strangely withdrawn (and so utterly impotent).

To be under the guidance of Reason in to have then, at one heart a profound antinomy concerning the unknown. Such a antinomy is essential to this species of reason in that one only need its guidance as one is dealing with the unknown, and the unknowable-  and yet it is then just this unknowable in itself that reason cannot grasp. All the guidance can produce, when faced with the worlds complexity are notions of Good and Evil (based on universals) which attempt to navigate us between encounters, and yet do not give us the means to understand the nature of those encounters themselves (4/68). Moreover this failure to grasp the unknown adequately is all the more profound, when one is dealing with pain (and so Evil –6/64), and so (ironically enough) it fails just when one needs it most to succeed! I will divide the antinomy up into three separate section : In first antinomy, I will examine the sense that the unknown must elude the guidance of reason; While in the other two, I will examine how the unknown (in the guise of fear or gratitude) imposes itself upon that guidance, and drives it elsewhere. 

The Skimpole/Pardiggle axis:

Perhaps the strangest problem that reason faces as it guides our mind,  is the exact location of the unknown itself.  For reason, this unknown is not something external to the mind, but rather must occupy a position between two totally different forms of consciousness. On the one hand there are the interests of reason itself that endlessly compares different states, and hypothesizes about the nature of the common notions found in them. On the other there is the consciousness (in the imagination) of how one is affected at one time or another. And yet between these two consciousnesses lies the abyss of the unknown. That is, the exact nature of the ‘another’ – which is both creating perception, and whose existence allows reason to make its comparisons and deductions. Moreover the very fact that both my consciousness of a thing’s actually existence, and my ability to reason from the nature of that existence are present in the mind in one glance, will tend to exasperate this problem. It is all too easy to assume that the two form of consciousness are one and the same – and thereby both give affects and reason a reality which is not their own. This is how Spinoza interprets the story of Adam (4/68s). He suggest in a sense there were two aspects to the Fall. In the first aspect of the Fall man mistakes what the guidance of reason would tell him to do for something real in the world, and therefore comes to see the world in terms of Good and Evil. The second aspect of the fall, then involves human’s making the opposite move, and assume that animals reason in the same way as they do, Hence the fall involve the confusing o different stands of conscious with one another – so that human standards attempt to manifest themselves into the natural world, while the natural world becomes the role model for the human (and is taken up a s a model by reason). The true message of ‘the Christ Spirit’ was for Spinoza that human freedom depended upon the idea of God alone (that is the intuitive third kind of knowledge, which can directly grasp at differences as difference) and that reason related to human interest alone.

   The guidance of reason alone therefore simply cannot grasp at the very unknowns upon which it is based (it takes the third type of knowledge to do that). Moreover if reason does mediate upon the nature of an unknown any such mediation s torn asunder by the twin (and irreconcilable) aspects of consciousness that such a mediation involves, each of which reflects the two aspects of the first type of knowledge (2/40s2). Or to put is another way one can – from within the paradigm of reason only think the unknown of either a Skimpole or a Pardiggle.

To think like Skimpole, is to accept that there exists some external Somebody over which one had no control – and yet upon whom one depends (455). As one then is in the grip of this Somebody, one cannot have any sort of control over ones own life, but will rather perceive it as external and determined as everything else (62).  One therefore tackles (within imagination alone) the world as if one was indeed one was some grown up child, who is as incapable of responsibility for itself, as it is capable of forming any fixed notions about the nature of the mysterious  Somebodies within which it associates (507). And yet of course things are note quite this simple even for such an imaginative ‘soul’, as the Somebodies (the selves) it endlessly creates for itself reveal more about its own nature than they do the nature of the other (2/16 c2), so that such an individual in the end ‘only looks after number one’ (657). Imagination – then and the consciousness that gives it –might think itself (and in a sense be) endlessly in the grip of Somebody- and yet it endlessly moves away from that somebody and back into its own interests and concerns and is utterly content to drop somebodies as soon as they no longer serve its usuage (698).

If Skimpole represents imaginative consciousness’ subtle bending of the external world back into itself own, then Pardiggle and her missionary ilk constitutes very much the opposite move, namely the attempt by reason (and though its universals) to reach into the world, and make a direct difference within it. As it makes this move reason fails to engage with the other. This failure can come in two forms . Firstly, it can fail because it never actually reaches the unknowns it endlessly schemes about (as Mrs. Jellyby has never gone to Africa, 34), and Mr. Quale ( and Mr. Gusher) are reduced to writing testimonials for each other (176). Alternatively reason can confront the unknown as the unknown directly but will then have no more point of contact with it that Mrs.Pardiggle does with the brickmakers (94-95). Indeed, theonly unknown such a reason can directly influence are those in its immediate power (for Mrs Pardiglle, her children), and then its tyranny, and inability to cope with difference will breed strange unknowns of their own.

  Jarrdyce, for all his wisdom, is strangely caught by the Skimpole-Pardiggle axis – and quite unable to rid himself of there differing attentions (he merely retreats the Growlery or finds relief in the former when pestered by the latter –176, while of course he endlessly defined Skimpole to Esther - 505). And this is all the more curious because he does certainly doubt the efficacy of missionaries in contrast to common notions (87), and is equally aware that Skimpole can have a malign effect (69-70). Likewise he is certainly capable of a qualitive assessment of the different claims made on him (he says that the letter written by Esther guardian was written with a stern passion that rendered it unlike any other letter – 205), and  acts accordingly (he therefore sets up Esther and Allan with a home of their own, while is contrast he insists that Richard have a career). It is not then that he cannot tell the difference between different forms of reasoning, so much as he is both incapable of actively forming common notions with the unknown itself. For example, Mr Jardyce’s relations with Jo (very much supreme unknown – 551 ) are then tinged with failure: He merely frets, expresses good intentions and discuss the nature of childhood with Skimpole, while Jo worsens and little Charley and Esther nurse him ( 371-372,); Or alternative  he is portrayed enquiring after Jo’s fate after the reader knows Jo is dead (593).  Jardyce therefore clearly embodies the antinomy at the heart of the guidance of reason – the antinomy that it can certainly appreciate common notion – and lauds then over other forms of reasoning-  it cannot of itself easily break with the Skimpole-Pardiggle axis – which is the only experience of the unknown is can directly grasp at.

The strange grip of fear:

In the middle of his consideration of reason Spinoza brakes of to consider whether one acts under reason through reason alone one acts because one is fearful (4/63). He answers very certainly in the negative. To act by fear is to act because one has an idea of some pain which one fears ( 3 Def: aff XIII), and therefore not to act from reason alone, which only knows desire and joy (4/59). The guidance of reason therefore, inspired by it is by common notions. must therefore avoid thinking directly of the nature of evil, but rather must simply flee indirectly, and as it is in quest of what it finds good (4/63 c). Or to put this in another way – is it actually wrong for reason, and even as it is dealing with others to attempt to form any ideas about what those others actually are, outside that is those that are caught in the interest of common notions. It is not then just that reason (alone) cannot think the nature of this unknown – but and far more strongly, it can only err if it attempts to do so. However, of course reason will neither be not be able to stop imagination from having such fears – or from consciousness not necessarily being able to tell these fears apart from what reason alone would give on its own. Moreover Reason, as it determined durations across which it exists, will not only spark of fears of its own, but even create a new opportunity to fear. If after all reason must chose a greater future good, over a lesser present one, then the present of this lesser fear itself will become negative and a source of fear (Spinoza makes this point in the context of his discussion of the Fall –4/68).  The guidance of reasosn therefore creates fear – and always risks warping ones action as one acts from the perspective of this fear alone.

But then is fear and reason are so closely aligned, why is it so very wrong to act from fear. Why cannot cannot (within measure) reason profit of a certain degree of fear, as it profits from a certain degree of pain? The problem in the end comes down to what essence of reason is – and the affect of fear upon that essence. As one reasons one must be endlessly open to the possibility of new commonalities emerging, and with then new understanding ( 4/26). One might therefore and from the guidance of reason alone, act to remove oneself from a certain situation where these possibilities are being eclipsed (4/27), but one does not on this account simply close down all the possibilities themselves (or even close utterly down the possibility that some future links might be established – 5/10). This however is then exactly how fear proceeds. It simply wraps up an entire sequence of impressions under one label and then proceeds as best it can to avoid them all. To act under the guidance of fear is to spin off from one situation into a whole sequence of acts which are no doubt designed to meet the occasion, and yet which actively occlude any further understanding of the initial problem itself; an occlusion which is not only problematic in its own right (4/27) but also is likely to exasperate the initial problem itself (3/39 et al).

Reason is therefore not only perpetually stalked by the fears that it creates, but also is tempted (if it listens to these fears) to occlude in itself the very ability it is trying so hard to establish. Reason very much risks being caught up in Jardyce’s dilemma whether to marry Esther or not. The immediate reason for this act is that Jardyce’s fears what could happen to Esther both once Ada had left Bleak House, or if it became known who her Mother was (520 – although he does hint twice he had thought of it before 518and 722). Moreover, and as he acts from the perspective of fear, he necessary forgets other possibility or options (he does not therefore consider what would happen if Allan returns), and therefore acts ill (724), even if he did act this good intention (722), and as I argued above, even if his action had useful (indirect) effect on Esther. It is of course to Jardyce (and reason’s) credit that once he (and it) is able to perceive adequately the problems of acting from fear (once it has so acted), and he (it) is flexible enough to modify his (its) behaviour. However, this is not to occlude his (its) role in actually generating in the first place fear (this was after all Jardyce and not Esther’s concern -520).

The Dangers of Favours:

. To reason is then to be at risk from the outside, as if one lets that reason develop within itself ideas of (and responses to) to the unknown, one has fallen of from reasoning itself. And yet, it is also the case the opposite danger is just as problematic. For the man of reason is other humans matter (and he is thankful to them) as he and they set up creative and evolving exchanges with then ( 3 def. Aff. XXXIV). It is critical for common notion therefore that each action provokes in another other acts, across which the relationship develops. Reason therefore clearly finds both owing and being owed a favour equally problematic. As the man of reason owes a favour to someone who lacks reason, then they are caught up by the way that other judges how that favour should be repaid, and so not simply free to respond to the common notion itself ( 4/70). Hence one can say a man of reason fears the favours of another because those favours risk him become that another’s ‘unknown’, and so only judge according to the nature of that other, and not for the merits alone. Likewise (although Spinoza does not directly consider this case) – reason is threaten by other gratitude. What reason’s needs is  a productive exchange, and not be thought of as some impenetrable and unknown benefactor, whom one can only approach in gratitude. What is more, as a person of reason is necessarily useful to others – they will be at endlessly risk of producing excess gratitude – for which they has no use (and which will even oppose there actual endeavours, as occludes in another the ability to fashion common notions), and yet of course which they cannot simply spurn without risking inspiring hatred in the very other they were sorting to court . The Jardyce, therefore is quite right both to flee from the gratitude he provokes and yet make an oddity or a joke of this fact  (55 and 724).

The guidance of Reasosn has then a very strange status. As one follow Reason’s guide one behaves as if there was common notions, even where there are none. Such a procedure has the advantgage that it can appeal beyond the immediate common notion with which one is surrounded, and therefore to some degree at least, beyond a set of habit. And yet it is perpetually risking tumbling into the very unknown that it creates, and cannot think in any way that can have use for itself (or for others), and which it can only endless fly or fight (4/69), To be a person of reason is then to inhabit the paradox of knowing quite what needs doing, and yet strangely to lack any ability to act to ensure it does.

Caddy- the Nice Surprise

Spinoza starts book five of ethics with a restatement of ‘parallelism  (and perhaps one on the most formal statement of Ethics). This proposition directly claims that ‘as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, so the affections of the body, or the images of things are ordered and connected in the body’ (5/1). But one must readt this propostion very carefully. For me the key phrase in it is surely ‘ affections of the body’. It this phrase that marks out this parallelism (between things and ideas) from the other use type of parallelism – that of causes (2/9). The parallelism of cause is set up between objects that are different from one another – and must therefore involve many differing ideas – each of which can be tied to a specific and external cause. Hence one might say the parallelism of causes is very much the ‘classic’ parallelism, which a very formal connection between changes within the body, ad changes within the mind. However, the use of the phrase ‘affections of the body’ – clearly remove 5/1 from any determinist reading of the proposition. This is because (and by 2/19) such affections, have no direct link with the parts of the body themselves (2/24), and therefore the parallelism of causes , but rather only to the endless interplay of each of those ‘parts’ as they differ across each other ( 3/13s Def. Of Individuals).  Hence, the sequence of idea is ‘relativized’ is a highly nuanced and marked way. Ideas stop depending upon the external world, and come to have importance only because they affect the body in a certain manner, with of course the nature of that affect will of course differ from individual, and within the same the same individual across time (3/51). Moreover, the criteria the value of an idea has shifted this move. Idea are no longer valuble because of their connection to set of causes, but rather because they allow the mind to interconnect –and move across very many other ideas/affects ( 5/9). Any one positive affect and its idea (and desires), will have then (potentially) indefinite use (and effect) to a particular individual, and yet remain inert, and soon forgotten to another. The parallelism of 5/1 turns then classic parallelism on its head. What matters is not an objective sequence of external causes (and the ideas that must follow from them), but rather the play of affects within the body-  a play that can see any single affect suddenly grown in importance, and become the root of a multitude of other ideas – and affections. Or to put is another way- the fact that our ability to form ideas of ourselves though the affection of the body grounds our experience not is external cause, but endless surprise, and possibility.

   So what one might go so far as to say, that the parallelism of causes is active pitched against the parallelism of causes (or at least one starts from this position). In the former, parallelism one starts of as a slave of circumstance, and external reality; while in the latter one detaches positive experiences from that external reality, and attempts unwind a life across them. This conflict of parallelism is very much the position Caddy finds herself within, at the start of Bleak House. Up until the advent of Esther in her life she is utterly bound to external causes, being merely a cog in the wheel of her Mother’s endless letter writing for the ‘Good’ of Africa (33-34). This position deprives her both from the comforts in her own life ( as  everyone is bound in a succession of external causes, so meal time is determined by the cook, and the cook by drink – 35));  and ensures she lacks  any accomplishments of her own (39), save the ability to write and be a drudge (169).  But her falling asleep in Esther’s lap, and subsequent walk (in which they meet Miss Flite, changes all of that ( 43-44). The whole experience itself constitutes a single positive affect within her body and mind (which is why both she did not care where they walked, and walked very fast), from which certain possibility and conclusion could drawn ( conclusion about her posture needed correction (so she starts dancing classes -161), and her skills in housework need improving (so she practises on Miss. Flite –169). She thereby draws out from a single experience, two positive elements, across which one will then unwind a life, much the perpetual astonishment of the far more ‘sensible’ Esther (161 et al).

The effect therefore of 5/1 is to swap over what matters in an experience. It is no longer the external world that matters but rather the affects the body feels themselves. Hence if what is positive in these affects is developed, then (and to the amazement of every else) indefinite consequence can follow from what appears to be the most trivial event (in Caddy’s case a fast walk to nowhere in particular). The methodology of the Nice Surprise is fundamentally a double headed one. One the one hand it is necessary to understand any one affect in terms of its role within ones own body – and how it helps (and/or hinders) that body’s ability to act. While on the other hand one must also look to the external world itself, and be able to rethink the affects others have upon one, to ensure than one remains as active as possible. However, different as these strategies are in methodology – there aim is of course exactly the same. Both endeavour to locate the positive in any experience, and then allow these elements to develop in their own right, and spark of new possibilities, and new surprises of their own.

How then does one form a positive idea of an affect?  Spinoza here is very sanguine. First he argues that what makes an affect so problematic is in fact our inability to separate it out as a clear and distinct ideas from all the other ideas which surround it – and apparently cause it (5/3). That is, once one understands an affect not in terms of what is done to ones body (by others), but rather in terms of what that affect is to ones body itself– then one transforms a situation, and opens up the possibility that one might be to do something about it. Moreover Spinoza suggest there is no affection of the body that one cannot form some kind of concept ( 5/4). Here, though one needs to note a very subtle point about his proof. He proofs the proposition that every affect of the body is knowable by sighting 2/38. This is the proposition (noted above, but I will return to it below) in which he first introduces the idea of common notions, and does so on the most general level imaginable. The proposition therefore simply states that there are certain very general features common to all bodies within extension, (namely being in a certain attribute and motion and rest), and so even the most disparate and conflicting bodies are capable of some sort of common notion.  It is therefore clearly eminently suited to explain how one can form ideas of negative affects – but not (superficially at least) the one to explain positive affects. After all, one might think that positive affects were far better explained by 2/39, which talked of a particular common notion that is set up between two individuals. And yet there is a clear reason why he cannot make this jump. The point about 2/39 is that it relates to an external body, across whose action the common notion is established. 2/38 does of course relate to external bodies, but abstracts from those bodies those elements which are common to all parts of the affecting process (and so equally present in the affection of the human body as they are in the body itself). That is, there is nothing actually special about the external affecting body in 2/38- it could be anything – just so long as it produces within an affect motion and rest. For an affect therefore to grasps at the relations of motion and rest that inform it (and create it), is then for it to grasp two things, Firstly, in such a notion it grasps directly its value in God as an affect. It has value (and existence) not because it is simply located within a chain of causes – but rather because as an affect it directly expresses what is real in both God and those things that follow immediately from God (2/45s): to use 2/38 is therefore to confirm the importance of the affect. But secondly, and following on from this last point, for an affect to understand itself though 2/38, is for it to understand itself as both creative and open. This is because each such affect is effectively no longer understanding itself in terms of another’s actual existence (2/8 c+s), but rather in the endlessly creative context of the immediate mode itself, which perpetually overspills any context, or actual existence to be forever erupting elsewhere. Affects are therefore understood not merely in themselves, but in an indefinate, and open manner.

To Understand an affect adequately is therefore to grasp the sense that it is opened – and endlessly recreative. Moreover it is often the failure to understand that affects in this manner that often creates problem in itself., Spinoza therefore claims that it is natural to human nature that every human wants every other human to share his temperament; However if this desire is linked to inadequate ideas it is ambition (and so bothersome); while if it is cast in reason alone it is called morality and endlessly useful (4/37 alt prf+ S).  This then is very Caddy’s experience. She finds that as soon as she thinks about exactly what it is that irritates her so in Esther’s and Ada’s present – (namely their being graceful and neat while she is awkward and untidy – 161, and 170), she is able to start thinking about what to do about it (she enroles for dancing classes, and helps Miss Flite). What is more, as mentioned above the effects of this affect is utterly open ended. It not only sees her Marry, but also set up as a dancing mistress on her own right . She renders active on of the suppressed longings of her ‘inky’ days; She had after all, when she had first met Esther declared how much happier she would have been if only Esther had taught her (40); And now she had not only ensured that (albeit indirectly) Esther had taught her and her husband(289),  but also had rendered directly active and open ended by setting up as a teacher herself : it is no wonder she exclaims ‘ ‘ Who would have thought of my ever teaching people to Dance, of all other possibilities and impossibilities (460).

Finally it is worth noticing here that what makes an affect useful is in part its very complexity, and this for three reason. Firstly such affect will inspire the mind to think many thinks in their very thinking, which of course Spinoza thinks is good in itself (5/9). Secondly (and coming out of the last point) as such affects make the mind think more things they are of course more powerful – and therefore more useful (5/8). Thirdly, a complex affect will be (and as it has more elements within it) will be joined to other images (5/11), and so flourish most (5/13); even more so if this affect is understood adequately, and so torn of narrow circumstances (5/12). Hence the methodology that allows affects to be creative is far from a reductive one, and its aim is not to reduce affect to their constituents parts, but rather to allow large complex affects their full creative potential – a potential which tears then from any one context, and sets this up as useful vortex of transformation within the mind. Caddy again knows this – she does no choose simply one aspect of her first encounter with Esther and Ada to develop, but rather considers takes up, and develops it in its very complexity, and so become in one move a dancing pupil/teacher/wife/housewife. All o which she bundles up in an affect named Esther, which is embodied for her not by Esther’s presence as such, so much as her face  (279 -which Caddy fondly squeezes 729).

The second methodology employed by the power of the surprise relates to its powers over external determining causes.  Here the methodology runs in the opposite direction – with the aim being that one divorces any affect  from a single cause – and rather come to view it in terms of a nexus of constantly changing factors (5/2 and 5/9). As far as the surprise is concerned here, the starting point must be a curious double-aspected feature of the relative strength external affects. One the one hand an affect is stronger (all other things being equal) if it is though in isolation (5/5). On the other hand, and apparently contradicting the last point, the more causes an affect has the stronger it will be (5/8). There is of course no real conflict here. In 5/5, an affect feels stronger because one has gathered within a single expression a great diversity of differing causes, all of which are held together by reference to their ‘determinate’ single cause. Moreover, to posit such a determining (and iscolating) cause, is for Spinoza to invariably  mistake the actual nature of things. Such a cause will not only be itself be composite in itself (and we are merely ignorant of the fact -2/35s); but also only as strong as it is because (by 5/8) it contains many other affects . Hence it follows that what appear to be the most powerful affects which rip across the mind, are often actually the most vulnerable to the dissolving alchemy of the surprise.  There very strength can be turned against then, as each of these parts are both understood individually, and so made to resonate elsewhere.

  This of course exactly Caddy’s experience. Before the advent of Esther and Ada into her life she is dominated by a single corrosive affect – which she calls ‘Africa’, which he wishes was dead (or in whose name she wishes she was dead –39). This single affect he explains her mother neglect, her own enslavery and lack of accomplishment her father’s desperation, not to mention the state of the house and the inadequate food (ibid). However (and under the influence of her single positive experience) she becomes able to  both separate out each element, and think how she will handle it. This process has stages. When Esther and Ada first meet Caddy again she is still working for her mother (and still inexpressibly angry about this fact –160); and yet she has already decided that she will stop doing so (and will escape Quale). But also has already identified as quite separate the grief she feels towards her father’s fate, and that of her siblings, and over all neglect of her home life. (ibid). however inexpressibly angry as she still is, she explictly says that these moves have  made her feel less angry with mother (170), a softening then  runs across the entire book (as she becomes more and more distant from her inky days) – and allows her to declare that although she never sees her mother (after her wedding) they are ‘good friends’ (458).

   Moreover when one compares this second methodology to the first and interesting change in position (and value) of external causes becomes immediately apparent. It is worth restating the role of external causes in the first methodology. In 5/9, Spinoza claims one has power of a singular affect by identifying as many contributory external causes for as possible.  This is because,  any affect’s power (and uses) is comprised of it having a plurality of cause, with each of which must lending part of its own power to the affect as a whole (5/8).  However it does not follow from this that each cause, gives a little bit of the affect (so an affect can be decomposed into a number of causes) ; It is rather the case that an affect takes up this powers into itself, and arranges itself across and through them, and gives itself power in them . This power then being comprised of the ability of the affect itself to make the mind see many things at once (5/9) . The point then being that the mind misunderstands its nature if  it gives itself in terms of particular external causes; and so the virtue (power) of an affect lies in ensuring that the mind always its as located within the middle of things. The ability of an affect to place one in the middle is then itself (as it is active) open, and able to expand itself across a life (5/11-13).  The role of causes in the second methodology is however very different. How a single affect – is under stood as being determined through an external cause alone. The affect in then only united (as a single affect) in the present of that cause – so to remove it is to remove the affect (5/2). What is more,  this external cause is of itself not stable within reason (5/5). ~One only thinks that a certain external cause has a effect (and produces in me a certain affect) because one is ignorant of the causes that made this affect. One can always therefore pull it apart into the causes. And yet, they causes clearly remain external (in themselves) and therefore will have their own affect associated within them, which is both unique to their individual cause (3/56) and unstable in itself (as it can always be divided into another set of causes and affects). To think affects in terms of external cause is therefore to open the mind up to an infinite regress of cause and its affect,

   As such, of course the regress of the second methodology is infinite – and yet there are two clear delimiters. Firstly at any one stage one can cream off the positive affects and draw them into the first methodology. This is exactly Caddy’s real practice. As mentioned above she divides the single Affect ‘Africa’ into a number of sets of causes. In the first set of causes she manages to divide out three separate elements of her life; namely her home life,  her activities outside the home (dancing and housekeeping); and finally he knowledge of the use (sometimes) of being a drudge (169). Of these three she then makes two resonate according to the first methodology (and therefore active principles in their own right ( so see stays forever dancing while here ability to work hard puts her is good stead (459) : She is then less angry with her mother, and yet still cannot express her anger. Latter she manages to divide up her residue home life into four new elements, these being : Her mother, her father, Peepy (a favoured sibling),  and Turveydrop (senior, to whom she expresses exaggerated duty). She last three affect in this sequence she manages to make active (to a degree), and able to resonate within one another. She therefore turns Turveydrop (and utterly in spite of himself) into a useful parental figure for Peepy (461), and a comfort for her father (ibid). Her mother then remains negative-  and yet she is increasingly distinct from Caddy’s activities (and remains so even when Caddy nearly dies in child birth – 580). Sp one might say, Caddy is a past master both of dividing dominating affect up into fragmentary (and distinct) causes (each with their own affect), and yet also of allowing affects which are positive a new life of their own (and thereby pulling them of into the first methodology).

  The second delimiter to division of causes is necessity itself. For Spinoza once one understands that all external causes are (as they are external) bound up the infinite sequence of causes then everything changes. This claim (for Spinoza) is a little more than simple fatalism. To understand this one needs to go back a bit in Spinoza. Spinoza suggests that ‘simple bodies’ have two distinct aspects. Firstly, each body serves not to define itself – but rather as the means across which the activities of all other bodies are defined (bodies are therefore mutually, reciprocally -the Latin is invicem) – defined (3/ L2); Secondly. Exactly whether one says that a single body exists or not depends never upon it – but rather upon the activities of all other bodies (namely upon the infinite chain of causes which connects up all bodies – 3/L3). Individual simple bodies then pulled into infinity in two distinct ways. Essentially each body gives as its essence the ability to make all other bodies be within the middle of a change; and yet ach body can only be said to exist as it itself is within the middle of all others bodies. Spinoza – when in 5/4 cites 2/38, and through that 3/L2 makes use of the first of these features. He then (effectively) makes use of the second in 5/6. Hence, his argument is that once one understands that any external cause only have actual existence because they are caught up in all other causes (across which that existence is given), then the very idea of fixing an affect in by the actual present of external cause becomes untenable, and so the affects that operate this way falter. Spinoza therefore gives the example of childhood. One does not pity a baby its wretched state, he suggests because one simply accepts this state in inevitable to being a human 5/6s). That is, one does not think of a baby’s helplessness as something odd (or even to belong to the baby at all) – it is rather merely drawn outside the state of babyhood – and seen as a necessarily external price one pays for being human.  To see things under necessity, is to understand then any state under the gaze of an externality which is external to any specific cause, and which cannot therefore create specific affects of its own. In a sense this is of course the final state Caddy reaches with her Ma, who, unable to establish any point of contact with Caddy, becomes progressively externalized (and impersonal). Hence, her mother never visits Caddy, when she is healthy, happy (even when pregnant –460) for fear the ludicrousness of her marrying a dancing master might rub off (458). And although she does visit the Ill Caddy this visits merely confirm her being removed and external to Caddy’s illness and pain (580). Caddy’s mother therefore sets she self up as something absolutely external to Caddy’s live-  and Caddy can call herself her ‘great friend’ (458) only once she accepts this fact.

There are then two very distinctive methodologies for the surprise. One can be surprised by ones own (or anothers) ability to be positive (as Esther is always amazed by Caddy’s ability to be positive ability ‘small world’ and limited ambition 459-460). Alternatively one can be surprised by both ones ability to recreate the world in dividing it into other affects, which  might then be made positive ( Esther is greatly shocked by the idea of Turveydrop being indirectly useful ( 461); and one ability to exclude the bad, as something external (to everything), and therefore not to be worried at. However it is clear for neither Spinoza, nor Caddy are these mutually exclusive moves. It is rather the case that the greatest good comes to the mind that is capable of synthesizing these two elements with one another. Spinoza argues that one only forms an idea of a chain of causes (and the external necessity which inhabits that change), as one understands every cause in terms of a determinate  (and singular) existence (5/7). And yet – it is exactly this move which reason – in setting up common properties avoids ( 2/40s2, and 44), as it always establishes its resonances between contrasting external causes. Moreover (and by his first methology )  an affect has been thought of as adequate if it occupies just this position between differing external causes (although for  their own reason).  Affects will therefore in quite their own way spin onto the domain of external necessity. Or perhaps one could say, they are its natural inhabitants, as their domain consists in being always external to any set of presents. Moreover, such affects will operate asymmetrically upon the affects that originate in some external cause. Those affects (or aspects of a single affect) that they positively agree with taken up and endlessly enriched; while those aspects  which they disagree with will be marginalised (and be so as much by the very process through which the positive is taken up, as any thing else) and so gradually excluded (5/7). Therefore the very strength of an external affect will be pitched against itself, and taken up in a process by which its more detrimental effects are gradually excluded.  Hence, an affect it is defined by reason, is forever uncovering new presents (new external causes) which it can take up into itself, and create more ways the mind can understand itself as being within the middle of things (5/9).

Caddy discovers much the same point, when first she turns her mind to thinking positively. In Esther (and her) walking fast she uncovers the affect of posture and dancing. This affect which she then sets up to be endlessly transforming, as through it, she gains husband, career; wealth (to a degree – 729),; and joy (739). But she makes the same basic move with teaching – setting Esther (or at least her face) up as a teacher (39, and 280), but then becoming a teacher herself (459), and one who never stops dancing (739). Or again parenthood, setting up first Turveydrop (indirectly, and too Esther’s surprise) as the father to her own father and her brother, but then, through having a deaf child (577), inventing he ways to be a parent (739) .Caddy then very much the mistress of the surprise. What is more, she shares with Spinoza the discovery that as one creates these positive affects, which spin between presents, then the power of previous external causes to effect one is gradually occluded – the fierce hate she felt for her mother and Africa is replaced by an affectionate toleration: Moreover even her mother is indirectly caught (and warped by ) this toleration, as she is her designs on Africa, and forced to take up universal suffrage instead (which would at least indirectly advantage Caddy).

But in the final account of her life (given by Esther – and in which if she will ever be done with recounting Caddy’s life.) it is clear that something else has happened to Caddy. Spinoza famously argues that affects seen under reason will necessary lead to the some idea of God (5/14). That is, in the context Spinoza uses the term, an idea that what actually matters – what is real is not individual external realities, so much as being the creative (and active) middle of things (the reference is therefore to 1/15- which argues God exists across everything – and through everything). Esther (let alone Dickens) would not of course recognize must a middle as God (and nor would probably Caddy), but Esther does feely admit is Caddy’s irrepressible revelling in the middle of change and in the most adverse of circumstance (459). For example, Caddy states with a great deal of pleasure the wonder of having so many changes even ‘in her small world’ (460); more poignantly it is this revelling in things that sees her through the illness associated with little Esther’s Birth (she irrepressibly plans for Little Esther’s life, and Happiness -577); and allows carries through having think of ways of relating to her deaf and dumb child in her ‘scanty leisure time’ (739).  Caddy therefore (although she certainly would not call it God )knows  that what matters in life is never a singular present- but rather the ability (through the surprise) to both engage with one circumstance, and yet at the same time to move beyond them: to that degree at least she surely knows of Spinoza’s god.

The Antinomy of the family

Spinoza is very clear about one last point – the surprise cannot exist without habits. I cannot therefore immediately deduce the affect of reason from the myriad different affects with which I am inflicted. It is rather the case that I need very carefully to mediate upon separate affects, on their strengths, and uses – when it is appropriate to use then, and when not (5/4s and 5/10s). This move has a twin advantage. Firstly it allows the mind to imagine affect free from specific consequences, and thereby set up the initial circumstance through which reason can come to operate within them (5/4s). Secondly it ensures that imagination is able to keep pace with reason, and establish within habits affects (and images) that directly reflect (and not destabilise) the affect of reason ( 5/11-13,). The surprise therefore clearly needs habits both to themselves up – and to keep themselves going. And yet, of course these habits remain external to it – as it is a surprise, and in Caddy are revealed to contain profound antinomies of their own. I will , as this the other antinomies divide this section into three parts. Firstly I will consider the antinomies of circumstance. That is the problem attendant with the Surprise need to build itself on existence habits; Secondly I will consider the challenges the Surprise sets frr the very habit it establishes. A topic I will divide up (as I did in the other sections), into internal and external elements

The Antinomy of Home-life.

Perhaps the profoundest problem Caddy faces is here inability to in herself form habits as such. She declares this much to Esther, saying that she wants to profit as much as she can from every Esther tells her ( 279), and declares that she means to learn housekeeping from Esther (170), and even asks to shown all Esther’s fidgety ways (358).  It is therefore Esther, to whom she turns to approval when she becomes a dancing mistress (459), and to whom she turns when ill (579). No wonder then that Caddy felt so bitter about her home life, what she from her  home life was a rich source of habits to meditate upon (and transform), what she got of course what a single habit (writing) and utter chaos in everything else (even dinner time moved –37). Unable to form habits of her own Caddy is of course very vulnerable to the habits of others. Hence when her husband comes with his own very established set of habits (perhaps, although not ever hinted at, these habits add to his charm for her?) she simply accept them – and so take Turveydrop at face value, much to Esther chagrin (288). What is more this tendency of Cady to be caught is not accidental to her nature. Esther therefore releases there was only the slimmest of chance that Caddy would be able to she through Turveydrop’s pretences (ibid). Caddy’s skill is therefore not to create happy circumstances, but rather to ensure (as long as those circumstances are complex enough) that happiness can be found in whatever circumstance – be it greedy father in law, or deaf and dumb child.  It is then on wonder that the Spinoza’s man of reason (aware as he is of this problem) wants to always ensure he has rich enough inadequate affects enough to live with (4/45).

The Antinomy of Pregnancy

Caddy has a second very deep problem, which goes back to propositions 5/ 11-13. It will be remembered (from what I said above) that the propositions developed the need of reason to ensure that its mind is stocked by images rich enough to accompany the affects of reason it is so busy creating.  It would of course so very easy for Reason to elude these images, and move beyond its blind imagining. This is then the peril that stalks Caddy. It would be so easy for her to surprise herself out of any habit (and therefore out of countenance or even life). Esther then again steps in moments. For example the necessities of her marriage force her up against her own inability to plan a wedding (either to sow, or clean her mothers house)., and so it is therefore Esther who cheerfully, and carefully, arranges both ( 355-358). Likewise – and of course far more traumatically, Caddy is of course quite ‘incapable’ of (being allowed by Dickens) to have a healthy Child, or normal pregnancy – and in producing the most surprising of children (whom only see could be used to) nearly kills both herself and it (577), and again it is only Esther that can save her. To exist as a surprise is therefore not only to need habit,  but to always (as one surprises to have extended beyond those habits one has-  and so (without Esther’s aid) to be in danger.

The Antinomy of Husbandhood.

Esther includes something very strange in her final account of Caddy’s life. Caddy’s husband – the dancing master has become lame, and cannot dance, and so Caddy (as well as looking after her differently abled child) has to work for the two of them. In a sense this is natural (he is always described as ill) and yet it reads like a final insult from Fate (or Dickens) – a final ‘issue for Caddy to deal with (which of course she does.). And yet there is clearly something a little deeper occurring here. When ( earlier in the book) Caddy leans to be a dancing mistress (459-460) this process had clearly already begun, She already does much of the dancing, while her husband merely walks him part, and plays the music. Esther indeed thinks that Caddy gives something very special of her own to dancing instruction: She might have learnt grace and self-possession from her husband, and yet had enriched them by her own pretty face and figure. Long before her husband is lam she is said need to hire a cab to take her from her dancing appointments, she had so many (430), something her husband had never required. Cn short Caddy’s alchemy was already (in  a sense) undermining Prince’s habits : For him Dancing had been something he had to do to feed his father, while for Caddy is becomes far more a away of life – and his habit becomes absorbed into hers. She has a similar corrosive effect (although this is no doubt positive) on Turverydrop’s habits. She doe not of course reform him (he remains a selfish old man). And yet she grafts onto his constant daily habits,  Peepy, who gets his papers and goes on his walk. Caddy is therefore is a sense caught in one final antinomy – not only does her ability to surprise risk her habits, but they also will, very subtly undermines and transform everyone else. The only people who are capable of resisting this corrosion of habit being Esther and Turveydrop, although their resistance is founded on quite different principles. Esther can resist Caddy’s erosion of habits – because she is always able to develop new habits . For example Esther is distinctly non-plussed by the advent of little Esther (whom she describes disparagingly as a piteous sight to those not used to it, noting merely that Caddy was - 577). Which is why Esther is then so appreciative of the endless schemes Caddy forms for Little Esther’s future. It is these that she knows of as – and describes in terms of habits (so she claims Caddy can form such schemes because ‘she was used’ to little Esther – although whether Big Esther very really got used to her God daughter was clearly problematic, she nearly forgets to mention the child in her final summing up of Caddy Jellyby –739)). Faced then with th very Caddy, and the strange Baby, Esther develops a new set of habits – a set that sees Ada drop (temporally at least) out of her life, and sees her very much arrange in Caddy’s poor apartments (579-581). Moreover Esther is not particular happy about this change (Esther therefore even with Caddy ill and in pain before her, is still is worrying about Ada and resenting her lack of time with Ada). Esther can then respond to the challenge by forming new habits-  that she partially resents. Turveydrop’s of course is a very different case. In his narrow self interest he can simply ignore the effects of Caddy –or rather subvert them to his own desires and preoccupations. Or ather he can allow thoe preoccupation to be modified in someway – while remaining still TurveyDrop.

Caddy caught up in very destructive paradox. She needs habit to work her surprises upon, and yet she must undermine (or at least irritate) every habit. She therefore only operate is she has either an Esther, who is capable of responding to new situations with new habits, or Turveydrop who is immune to all surprise. And yet, this need is very asymmetric. She needs habit more that the custodians of habit need her. What is more, as custodians of Habit they do not quite appreciate her surprises for what they are (Esther says she only knew the best of Caddy when Caddy is ill therefore –i.e. when habit and surprise meet 579). Esther therefore very pointed prefers Ada (thinking Ada far more pretty and Caddy on the latter wedding day- 361, as well as worrying about the former when the latter is very ill),, while Turveydrop is incapable of valuing anyone apart from himself. Hence the surprise needs habit, while habit needs (to stay a habit) to distance itself from this need. So that, one might say it is essential to the surprises means of operation, that fate does not leave them in peace. Or perhaps it is better to say it is the surprise that cannot leave habit (or fate) alone – that forever worries it, and then cheerfully takes the consequences of this worrying, as Caddy cheerfully dances through a life that endlessly betrays her.

The Unknowable Allan:

Allan must rank as one of the strangest – if most romantic Hereos in English literature. He is a man who clearly has a deeply passionate soul, with his talk of sacred trusts, and a love that remains even if beauty has gone (703), and also equally inspires deep passion in Esther (702 and 721) – and yet all these passion are either dressed religious fervour – or firmly ‘noises off’ from the main action. He is therefore merely the dark surgeon who Esther, when asked by Ada if she did not Like, confessed that she did (157), and man whose presence is added as an addendum to Esther account and never directly engage with in the action itself. Esther might be quietly falling in love this him, and Allan might be doing likewise – and yet none of this is seen. All Esther wriote about on her own account, is a  write of is certain  uncomfortableness she feels in Allan’s mothers presence, and at the thought of his going away; While in her account Allan’s interest in her is merely given within a general  declaration that his final meeting with Esther (and Ada) before his ‘long, long voyage’ would be a memory to treasure, and his leaving of flowers (203-209). Esther is then only able to directly confess her love for Allan much later, and when she feels her illness has moved him forever beyond her reach (429). Nor is this coyness restricted   Esther narrative alone, The other narrative is equally circumspect. Allan is introduced merely as the ‘dark young’ – whose arrival on the seen (of Hawdon’s death bed) is not even announced (120), and who wanders through the dangerous Tom-all-alone for no other motive than he cannot sleep (534). Hence it is not just Esther who is coy about Allan (for understandable reasons) – it is also bizarrely enough Dickens himself. The question then is why? Is Dickens merely being lazy – or forgetful?  It is of course true that many of Dickens Romantic male heroes are not drawn much beyond the necessities of role in the romance – and yet at least they are formally introduced into the seen – they do not suddenly ‘arrive’ (and also at least their passions are made obivous). Why thn is Allan singled out for such shoddy treatment?

  Or to put this question another way – is their something essential in Allan that cannot be developed – or is Dickens merely being lazy – and treating Allan badily? Here something very different in the nature of Allan’s being a personal of reason, and all the other persons of reason considered in this chapter become important. In their very differing ways, Ether, Jardyce and Caddy build up their reasoning from their own individual perspective- whether that is a habit, a history or a small world. Allan is different: His entire life is caught not so much by what he is – but by how he is engaging with the unknown; So much so, that he cannot even have his own sleepless passion, which he expresses in a walk) without showing excess care for others upon that walk (534). For him reason prevents him from simply proceeding to unwind his own nature- but rather necessitates him is a perpetual engagements with others. It is then this perpetual engagement with others that makes him so difficult to locate: Allan reasons it is genuinely hard to tell where he beings – and others start.  Spinoza makes just such a point when he suggests that reason, as it dwells on what is common between distinct objects, cannot constitute the essence of any one of them (2/37). Hence one might say Allan – who ruses into the unknown always exists is a domain beyond individuality –and lacks a singular essence which embodies that individual as it actually exists (2/11). However is it clear that this lack of essence is not a simple phenomena. As I mentioned above, Spinoza actually considers two very distinctive occasions that reason in grasping what is common eludes essence. The first such occasion relates to reason as it grasps what is common to all bodies, while second relates to reason as it grasps at certain very specific properties a body shares with particular others. Each occasion needs then to be considered separatel, and very subtle difference explored. I will do this, as I have done through the rest of this chapter, using both Spinoza and a character from Bleak house (this time Allan) as my guides.

   The first common notions that Spinoza proves relate to what is most general – and common to all bodies. As I discussed above, he argues (in 2/38) that there are certain facets of existence that not only all bodies, but all affects of a body must share. For example, all bodies are comprised of relation of motion and rest, and all bodies must involve the attribute of extension (3/13s l2). The ideas then of these facets are adequate within the mind. However a very careful distinction needs to be drawn here between the use I put this proposition to above, and what will be argued here. . In the case of the Surprise, what mattered about this commonality was the ability it conveyed to any affect to understand itself is something external to any one actual present. In this case, and as one grasps towards the unknown what matters in a sense is the lack of that actual present. The difference here between an attempt to think ones own affects, and the attempt to use the same common notion to locate oneself within the world.  This latter use is problematic. One can form of course form an adequate idea of oneself (that is for Spinoza of ones own mind) and yet this idea will not quite be what it appears, as it is always caught up between two set of inter-related (and irresolvable) unknowns. The first set on unknowns arise from the position of the mind as the idea of the affect of the body. Such an idea will necessarily locates itself between elements over which it can have no control, as of which it can have no clear idea (2/25 and 27). When the mind then grasps at one of these most general of common notions, it does do in a way that necessarily involves these unknowns, Hence to think such a notion is to be necessarily linked to others – across which that notion is thought, and yet which cannot be adequately grasped in themselves. It is therefore to almost as a condition to a unknowable part of the world, and unknowable element across which that unknown part manifests itself. Secondly, the mind is only able to think itself in terms of its most unstable and least personal element – only that it as it is caught up in change it cannot control or of itself participate within. Hence the mind-  even as it perceives its relation of motion (or position in the attribute) adequately- is caught up not only within unknowns which not only t can never directly perceive but also in the process of turning into what is currently unknowable to itself (being caught up in motion).

  Moreover this situation is made all the more paradoxical as it is these most generalized of common notions which allow the mind, as it reasons, to include the mind in its perceptions.(2/38). Other ways to reason might well be more useful (in themselves), and yet as they remain either tied to a certain circumstance or affect, fail of themselves, to  include in them a formal account of the mind. Hence for Spinoza to attempt to plan out a life which is based upon reason as it engages in the world, is to open oneself up to the openness of change- an openness where all one can guarantee is that one will not remain as one was.  Allan, the ships surgeon, on a journey to India and China, while in love, is a very exacting embodiment of this situation. Starting one the last point first. Allan is making the journey because he has a thought of himself in other times – and other across other circumstance – a thought of himself as the rich and successful suitor of Esther (703).  In the name of this love then he embarks upon a journey whose exact goal is not in itself distinct, ostensibly being both  India and China  (206), and of course is ultimately nowhere (428). Likewise Allan’s position as ships surgeon incarnates very directly the situation generalised common notions find themselves within when pitched into the world. So as a surgeon he forms adequate ideas of his bodies (and others), and yet does it only as he is dependant upon skills these others have (sailing), and ultimately located within a situation (on the sea) whose exact nature is beyond any one individual (it is defined by nature’s order), and could easily act in a way that preclude any one individuals ability to form common notions.

   Moreover the integral instability in Allan’s ability to adequate perceive himself is carried beyond the sea. His love for Esther, as it is characterized through his relations  with her on his return are characterized by a similar shifting of perspective that haunts their giving. He therefore on his return both immediately encounters Esther, and yet does so in strained circumstances (he is conscious of still poor, and she of the changes in her looks).  And then, when  Allan subsequently does have good fortune (through the agency of Jardyce), he then discovers that Esther’s sense of duty precludes her marrying anyone but Jardyce (702); only to then discover (through Jardyce’s agency) is does no such thing. Allan , and the love he feels might then be of itself constant – and yet what that love is(and what it can do) is constantly being re-wove, and rethought-  and it – in giving itself  is caught up by external circumstance. The difference then being between Caddy’s reaction to this same circumstance and Allans, is that Caddy is content to know affects as they effect her alone (and so sets them up between external causes), whereas Allan wants his affect related to the external world itself (the unknown), and must suffer the consequences as perspective shift beyond his control.

The second type of common notions is quite different., and one whose possibility goes back to the definition of the individual. Individuals are created, Spinoza suggests because certain particular bodies communicate their motion one to the other according to a particular ratio (3/13s Def, Ind).  Hence what makes any one individual is a certain way motions directly differ one another other.  From which two things follow. Firstly, the existence and nature of any one individuals depends upon the maintenance of relations in others ;But secondly , in any one individual there will be a certain manner across which its contributory movements different one another, and as they are constituting its own existence. Two further points are then significant about this manner of differing. Firstly, and by definition, it is set up to be equal in the part and the whole of any one individual. This is because, for Spinoza, what it is to be material (as opposed to an affectual) part is just this ability to be caught within a certain manner of differing. Any individual remains a part in another, only as it is caught up in the nexus of differences (what I call here the manner of differing), across which that other is formed, and not because any integral properties of its own (ep32). Secondly. as these precise manner of differing within a body is the individual is a product of the constituting bodies that come together to form that individual, God will have an adequate idea of this manner of differing, as he has an idea of the individual itself.  Indeed within any one body there are virtually at least an undetermined number of manners of differing (that is ways that a difference is made across its parts) which are included within the idea God has of that body.  What is then allowing these potentially distinctive manners separate existence, is that fact that two (or more) bodies share them. If two bodies then come together, and affect one another across shared manners of difference, then these manner stop existing virtually, and within the individual idea of a things existence (an idea which of course no one individual contains –2/19); and become rather a way that differing individuals affect one another. When this occurs, each individual involved in both the way they are affected, and the way they react to that affection, will directly express a certain manner of difference. Therefore the idea they form will be adequate Each participating individual will thereby directly form  an idea of the differences across which there existence is arranged (all of which is from 2/39).

   When one forms a common notions with others one enters into – and becomes a part of  the very way another individual composed their own nature. However this much an accord is of course in itself a surprise. This because the accord is open up on a level that can never (or itself) directly perceived (even by God, whose sees only his idea of a body existing) – or known in any other way than though the accord itself.  It is then no real surprise that Allan, the man of such common notions, cannot be formally introduced, or that his first words are to agree with another (more venial) surgeon (120). Likewise his actual point of entry into Esther’s narrative is also problematic. He is merely stranger who was oddly included in a family dinner party,  and whom Ada and Esther said they liked. One might go even further and say that it is essential to Allan that as he is given in particular occasions (and not in general)  is genuinely tricky to locate – as he does not exist in any one present (or place) , but rather as the living expression of a manner of difference arranges himself across presents, and place: He is then more an atmosphere of accord and happiness that a persona as such. It is then not concidence that his presents is noted as an addendum to some of the intense occasions of young Esther’s life (Richard and Ada’s engagement –157, and becoming friends with Caddy – 170-174).

     Moreover, as active ideas, all common notions are of course progressive and transforming.  Manner of difference are then no eternal Platonic idea, waiting to be realized.  It is rather the case that common notions endlessly operate to create new ways across which a certain manner of difference can be expressed. One might divide this creation into three dimensions.

Firstly any one common notions is not restricted to the particular exchange through which it is formed. On the contrary once one has such a notion, it is free to stretch back across all of one life (and memory), and uncover in past perceptions, and thoughts, common notion. It will then have (as I discussed in the case of Esther) profound effects on ones attitudes towards memory.   Moreover Allan actually adds an extra twist to these effects. Esther constantly forms common notions across memories, and so her narrative is set against time  (which is why it is so problematic). Allan, however can do something distinctive is that he can open out to a common notion which fixes not one a memory but rather  Spinozian tense. Spinoza argues that past or future represent the mind as it knows itself to be, in enduring, caught up in change it cannot control, or experience as any other than it ‘being changed’ (5/39s). Such a change comes in Spinozain two parts. Firstly it is set up across differing experience all of this are somehow connected within one another (Spinoza gives therefore the example of a day, where all experiences are linked by the passage of the sun –2/44s). One forms an impression then of a tense through this passage across time. Secondly this the passage becomes something positive in itself, which of its itself posits the conditions in which certain impression can be or not (3/18 s1). Time is therefore for Spinoza, is problematic (in the sense that the change is contingent upon the sequence of nature), and yet very important in how one handles affects (much of the second half of book 3 of ethics concerns either affects slipping into the past, or failing having an extra affect because they are past). Normally and insofar as time involves a sequence of particular presents one cannot form a common notions of it ( as it relates merely to the order of nature) – and so neither Esther or Jardyce can form a common notions with it And yet Allan, however, who is always engaged with manners of difference, does have some sort of access point-  as he can at least perceive how it might be that a certain manner of difference (in which an individual is caught) is impelling them towards the future or past.

  It is this sense of what is past – that informs his first meeting with Richard, on his return from India. Esther asks him whether he thinks Richard has changed. He replies:

   ‘ It is not his being so much younger or thinner or fatter, or paler, or ruddier, as there being upon his face a singular expression…One cannot say that it is all anxiety, or all weariness; yet it is both, and yet like ungrown despair’ (532)

What he thereby identifies as emerging is Richard is neither a comparison across which a time has changed, nor yet a current state of mind (although it includes that state), but rather the very splitting which is the essence tense itself – the splitting of despair – in which  Richard’s hopes are from the present and  into an irrevocable past ( see 3/appendix def XV) . Richard cannot himself express the essence of this difference (which is antithetical to his nature), and yet under Allan’s gaze, he can grasp the sense that he is caught up in another (that is he can understands how he is embodying another in a change). He therefore says to Allan that whereas before he has always wanted an object now an object (the Jardyce case) had him (587). That is, he understands that he embodying anothers time – and so changed by the case (449), but cannot grasp the how the essential nature of that time is to place him within the past –and do so even as he is giving it, ad so merely claims nothing can be done about his being caught(587).  In Allan then perhaps, Dickens goes much further than Spinoza and develops the idea that common notions not only change ones attitude to memory- but also give a new access point on what the past actively is.

Secondly any common notion will contain a multiplicity of other (or general) notions. While it will not (of itself) directly develop these subsidiary notions (as such a move would involve it becoming less perfect),  this not of course stop it aiding the development of such notions. This is because (by 5/7) any common notion is perpetually present (is a certain way) in the mind. If then an affect occurs which expresses (as a part of it) a certain manner of differing that is subsidiary to the richer common notion, that rich common notion will be present to the mind – and therefore available to find a resonance within that affect. Such a resonance will have a complex character of its own, as it will occur both within the richer common notion – and yet (on another level) be external to it. It will occur within the richer notion in that, as the subsidiary common notion is developed (as its own manner of difference) that development will not break free from the richer notion, so that any development of its subsidiary manner of difference  will (insofar as they comprise its ‘parts’), further enrich an encompassing notion (that is will open up new ways across which it is). And yet the subsidiary notion is external to the wider notion in that there will exist between the two a fault line where the lesser breaks with the former. What is more, this fault line, will then become a further trigger fro common notions, as understanding grasps at it why exactly why it exists (and how it could be changed).

   Allan therefore discovers that he cannot simply enter into one deep common notions with Ether, without others immediately becoming caught up and resonating within it. On his return from London, he cannot therefore express his love in a walk (in Tom-All-Alone) on sleepless night, without the events of that walk being caught up (to a degree at least) but that love. Here Dickens though adds another extra interesting twist of him own. Some subsidiary common notions – as one forms them might immediately flow back into the richer common notion – merely becoming an adage of it. Alternatively (and more problematically) they might apparently set themselves up – to a degree at least at least against it. On this walk then Allan meets two individuals whose life has been entwined with Esther’s. The First is Jenny (the brickmakers wife), the second being Jo. In the case of Jenny then, the common notions he makes with her all immediately flow back to (and further enrich) his love for Esther. He therefore dressing her perpetual black eye that Esther had noted, and worried about (92) with the aid of his handkerchief (535), as Esther had aided Jenny long before with hers (97).  Allan’s dealing therefore with Jenny (and his forming of common notions with her) are then merely an outgrowth of his common bond with Esther.

   With Jo – things are quite different. This is of course there is a deep point of divergence between Jo and Esther – in that she became ill (and lost her looks) through him. Allan therefore cannot immediately take Jo up into his bond with Esther ( and indeed has to fight against an antipathy he feels for Jo –537-538). He cannot therefore simply absorb Jo into his love for Esther (as he was going to do with Jenny). But rather  must develop his own relationship to Jo (that is his own set of common notions with him – he therefore feeds Jo, and finds somewhere for him to sleep – 540-542). But all the while he does this Allan is aware that he going what Esther would want him to ( he therefore asks Jo things in her name 538-539,and 545) and therefore in his further developing common notions in Jo he is also enriching his relations with Esther (549). Moreover the relationship with Jo enriches Allan bond with Esther in a way he could not predict, and will take time to develop. Jo therefore tells Allan of his encounter with Esther’s mother, and everything that followed from it (541). A story that in itself prefigures not only the  future which is yet to develop from the account  (the flight of Esther mother, and Allan and Esther’s role in finding her- 679-684); but also a past (the fact that Allan had stood by the death bed of Esther’s father; and even more profoundly the totally unlooked for and apparently unrelated future in which Jardyce schemes to ensure Allan and Esther marry (Jardyce singles out the fact that Allan has stood beside the death beds of Esther’s mother and father as one of the reasons it is so appropriate that she marries him (723). Finally the fault line itself between Esther and Jo will itself become (in differing ways) critical for both. For Jo this fault line remains absolute, and comprised  his death, and he knows it. Jo therefore asks his friend Snagsby, after that death , to write,  as large as he (Snagsby) could that he (Jo) was sorry about infecting Esther – but never meant to do it. For Dickens therefore Jo’a acceptance of the fault line sees him transformed from a mere (with less consciousness than a Dog –191) into an ethical animal, whose last words were the Lords prayer (551). For Esther Jo’s re-appearance, and story garbled story about how he disappeared, has a very different effect, as it is merely one more piece in the unmasking of Skimpole as a hypocrite, who she break with utterly once the story is confirmed by Bucket (656-657 and 699).  For Esther therefore what was negative in her encounter with Jo was not his fault  not only he could not help being ill , but also what perplex her most (his ungrateful disappearance) was an aspect in someone else’s story .  One might therefore conclude for the subsidiary common notions the difference between it and the richer one in which it occur in absolute (but potentially ennobling), while for the richer one, as it contains the other as its subsidiary, any limit never belong to the subsidiary itself.

Thirdly, and as they express a manner of difference, there is no integral template to exactly what that manner is (or rather the template simply is the body itself). Any one manner of difference will then be perpetual transforming its exact expression (and doing this actively as it is given). It will therefore both tend to deepen its expression (as more and more of the mind are caught up in its giving), and develop new facets for itself, that is new ways that this difference can be thought or given. Or to put in another way, a common notion will not just think a commonality – but will in thinking it, actually develop, and enrich it – creating new sense in which it can be expressed, and thought.

Allan and Esther therefore cannot be simply in Love constantly as Ricahrd and Ada might - but rather, as they enter into a profound common bond, will be endlessly creative in the manner through that is expressed. Allan move in Esther account from therefore from the perfect dinner guest (even if he is only added in addendum); to hero (526); to the particular friend for Richard (532),; to a help meet who endlessly aids acts of mercy (not just Richard, but also Jo and Caddy); To the lover must reject (703); and finally the husband one must accept (723). However one needs to be very careful that one does not understand the relationship between these facets (and the deepening of the notion accompanying it) in terms of Duration for two reason. One the one hand: the deepening of the relationship that grips Allan and Esther does not involve evolution so much as eruption, as more and more of their mind becomes taken up with the common bond affected both of them. Allan therefore repeatedly crops up in Esther’s narrative in a way that  at times appears almost incidental to it : for example, it is therefore Allan who brings them new of George’s arrest  (595),, and who meets Esther and Bucket in London-(679). But behind in accidental lies a deepening common bond, which as it occupies their minds more and more (as it develops),, will erupt across more and more experiences. What is more this eruption defies history  and any emplacement within a past (however productive). When, then, Esther refuses Allan hand, they attempt to become history for one another (703), and yet then only discover there relationship (in the form  of the new bleak House), jumps out of that very being history (722-724). One the other hand, it is firmly not that each facets builds upon the last, leading irrevocably to marriage. If anything the opposite is the case. Each individual facet has (is a sense) ‘marriage’ inscribed on it ( Jardyce thinks Esther will marry Allan the dinner guest – 156, and Ada thinks Esther will marry Allan Richard’s friend 695). But what then blinds Ether to this fact is the very plurality of these facets. Esther (and also Allan, as he is making a common bond with Esther), know there is no limit or end to the number of facets their common bond will develop (703);  and therefore no termination point in the real world, no final stage which marriage would represent.: Esther makes this exoplicit enough, claiming that Allan should not be rewarded by money, but by giving an opportunity to help an unlimited number of people (582) . Common notions are not then of duration, and any attempt to bind their ability to re-develop new  facets for themselves to duration, is to fail to capture their nature.

  But this of course begs the question – how does one understand the relationship between what I have called above facets of one common bond and the common bond itself – if not through duration? The deployment of a rich common notions which deals with something unknown across the mind is highly intricate, and worth more than one study in itself. All I will do here is discuss broad themes within this deployment, before I go one to discuss how a common notion that relates to the unknown is limited (and what antinomies flow from it). Firstly one needs to locate exactly what it is in the common bond that is so hard to locate. Spinoza argued (it will be remembered) that God does not have an idea of what creates this bond separate from the body itself, unless that bond is already operating –already working (2/38). One only then knows that one is part of a common notion when ones perception becomes adequate (2/38c), and therefore gives the sense within which one acts to a perception, as a part of that perception. Moreover this ‘being adequate’ is itself only given within this act of  this creation and cannot be directly perceived (which involves imagination alone) in itself. From which it follows that while common notions cannot be thought out of the circumstances within which they are constituted; what actually makes the common notion, namely the accord in the body, both does exist before any particular notions are deployed, and can link up apparently disparate notions within one rich and complex notion, the question of course is then how. Or to put this last point another way. The normal procedure in common notion is that one proceeds from what one knows to find notions (see all section above!). But here in 2/38 in the idea that common notions are defined in this unthinkable and very real  bond between two bodies, a second possiblity opens out. Suppose if rather that starting within the known and building common notion, one started with the unknown-  with the unspeakable of the commonalities of the body – what would common notions look like then?

  Such is of course the case with Allan and Esther when he returns to Britain. In terms of imagination what they have is defined by lack. Allan has failed to make any money, and Esther has lost here looks: all they actually have is the memory of a past acquaintance. And yet beyond this acquaintance is a deep accord in their nature – and accord that both are in differing sense aware of-  and feel the need to develop. The question is how? How does a rich, but as yet undeveloped seem of commonality deploy itself across the mind without being mistaken either for images or for the specific commonalites in which it is manifested? Allan’s inspired answer  this is ‘sacred trusts’. He is aware that he cannot develop the totally unknowable common bond he has directly with Esther, and therefore seeks in her name numerous other subsidiary bonds for it – across which it will be expressed. Each of these bonds (what I called facets above) is however a common notions in its own right (and therefore has its own dynamic). It is, of itself then only dependent upon his bond with Esther in its inception. That is at the point in which Allan initially pitches the common notion he is making. This fact means that Allan is free to make common notions from a slightly different angle than normal. For example, as  I have already discussed above that his entry point into Richard’s life is not through a common notion he forms with Richard’s mind so much as directly his body (that fact that body is staring to unwind desperation). Allan therefore comes at Richard from an unexpected angle, and therefore able to talk to him in way no one else is and  mingle treatment with friendship (695 and 700-701).Moreover, even when the common notions Allan forms are more ‘usual’, it is still the case that Allan comes to them, and set them up, through his relationship with Esther. For example  when Caddy is ill, Allan very much  models the care he gives on Esther’s fidgety ways. Not only then does be come at regular times (and so Esther can avoid him) but also takes particular care and attention to Caddy (581).

   One needs caution with the last point however, and be clear what is not being argued as much as what is.  Each common bond formed is independent from both all the others, and the rich notion that led to its inception,  and remains so . There is no ‘strange’ Deleuzian communication opened up between each bond as such. One of the curious features then in the text is that all Allan’s sacred trust are developed separately form one another-  and almost is isolation for each other (indeed one – his relationship with Jo, is actually out of temporal synch with the rest of the narrative). Moreover when at various times a communication is established between each facet it is invariably misguided in someway (and illusionary). Esther therefore thinks that Ada’s apparent sadness where she (Esther) is helping out Caddy, and so not seeing Ada much, relates to Ada’s grieving for Esther over agreeing to marry Jardyce rather than Allan (582). For Esther, Ada’s sadness is the result of a communication between different facets (Caddy, Jardyce, Allan etc), but in fact it was no such thing- and was internal to Ada’s own doings (584). Or again Jardyce assumes that all the bonds that Esther is making with Allan are actual caught up within one another, and therefore expressive of a deeper love ( he therefore asks Esther if she had ever notices something frustrated in Allan –583)-  Esther replies perfectly properly (in relation to their common bond, but it relation to Allan – for the distinct see below) that this was not the case, and that all she hopes for Allan is that he continues to develop new facets.

If the subsidiary bonds are not then directly communicating with one another- how can one think the reality of the common bond?  This is of course goes right back to the problem of how one thinks the unknown accord constantly re-recreates common notions. Dickens here as a very interesting treble headed answer to how this accord is thinkable,. Firstly what defines this bond is not a particular incarnation of it, but a desire that it have indefinite incarnation.  The more then Allan is caught up with Esther – the more facets they develop, the more she wants to form. It is therefore no wonder then that she finds her gratitude to Allan inexpressible by words alone, or that she comforts him (after reject him) with the image that all further developments in her character would be due to him – and his love for her (703) Secondly each subsidiary bond is not an event. This goes back to 2/38 and its corollary. Each Common notion is not an event. There is of course an event which occurs, and prefigures the notion this being the affecting of one body by a certain ‘property ‘ in another (a property that however does not exist until this affection this happening). And yet beyond this initially prefiguring the common notion owes noting to the event that set it up, and is utterly distinctive from it. However as I argues above Allan and Esther proceed from the accord itself – thought separately from an event which might have triggered its expression. From such a perspective, Allan does not need ‘events’ but rather can directly take over, and develop Esther’s common notions (it is this that gives him the ability to develop across Richard a common notion Richard himself cannot directly share in. Moreover as Esther and Allan unwind their own common bond within other bonds – there is no need for them to though events. Esther therefore says she did not see as much of Allan as one might have expected (when she was look after Caddy (581). A deep common bond therefore finds direct expression in a creativity without event. Finally, there is an odd braking down of the temporal order of the narrative structure in Bleak House that is associated with Allan and Esther’s endlessly spawning of facets . The facets are simply not recounted in the order they occur in. Jo’s illness and death is then given before both Caddy’s illness and Alan’ taking up with Richard , and yet must occur certainly after the latter, and probably after the former. This confusing of the temporal order  not being the preserve of Esther’s account (as Jo’s death is in the other narrative).  The clue to understanding this confusion in a sense lies in he very independence of each facet. They might occur together, and yet they must be accounted for apart. And yet then that account sets up a problem in itself. as each set of notions is distinct in itself – but the common bond is which they all adhere is not. It is not therefore enough to account for each facet as simply separate – it must also trace across these facts the growth in expression of a commonality that can be expressed in none of them. Thus development then sets itself up against any temporal order. If one simply recounted what happened where and how all the facets were contemporary to one another, one would utterly loose sight of what really mattered in the sets of notions themselves, as one would loose both facets disit6nct aspect, but also the way that aspect realtes o soething lesle – an elusive common notion which is developing itself acorssall other, and thohgh all others.

The Antinomy of the unknown.

  For Spinoza perhaps, my account of common notion above is a little cheating. I have started out from the hypothetical premise that two natures can have a perfect and yet unknowable accord between their natures. The move has then been to express in term of these natures that accord.  For Spinoza such a jump must remain hypothetical (and so the province of novels) because no two natures will exactly accord. For his one can then only make this move by the jump to God. He therefore argues that reason ultimately leads to an idea of God – an idea which then generates a totally different way of thinking in its own right ( 2/41-42 and  5/14-20). What is significant about God here- in the current argument – is that God has an ability to straddle the divide between the two set of common notions one makes in relation to the unknown. So that, the sense that one is in God is the same whether one thinks of ones own existence (and how one is a part in the infinite immediate mode) or the way through which as one exists one enters into relations within others  (2/45-47).  Moreover this reconciling of the twin forms of common notions will always falter without God – as one would be faced with the choice of either understanding one ability to form a common bond with others or to be a part of existence itself, but not both. Spinoza therefore explicitly says ‘ they who understand themselves and their affects, clearly and distinctly love God, and the more so they understand themselves and their affects (5/15).

    Without a synthesis called God, there is always a limit integral to the common notions of the unknown. It the case of general notion this limit as that one could give an idea of oneself, but only one the condition that that idea asserted numerous way one could change across the infinite immediate mode. However things are just as problematic is one proceeds from more specific common bonds. These bonds are limited by three factors (which I could conveniently enough ignore, when I was considering the hypothetical case of two absolutely similar natures). Firstly all specific common bonds, to form a common notion  there must be a ‘usual’ manner in which the body is affected 2/39. that is, the relationship that actually sets up the common notion is itself contingent – and it is quite possible to imagine either never forming or once it has formed being warped beyond use by other differently disposed external bodies. For example it becomes increasingly difficult for Esther to talk to Richard, as he is gripped by the Jardyce case..Secondly each specific common notion – is just that specific. That is (save in my hypothetical case above) there is a limit to what is actually shared (that is the ‘property’ that is being held in common)– a limit which simply cannot be thought (as it remains in God only as he gives the idea of each individual body separately).. There is therefore an absolute limit to the notions Allan can develop with Richard, and he cannot save his (or Jo’s) life.  Finally one of the affects of Spinoza’s definition of consciousness (as the idea of an idea) is that ones consciousness of a specific common notion is very particular one.  One is certainly conscious one oneself, as one has an adequate idea (2/43), and yet this consciousness is bounded by the circumstance that idea is had. If one is forming a specific common notion there is therefore noting which makes one move beyond that certain consciousness, and into a more general idea of the mind. So it follows there is nothing integral in Esther’s situation of making repeated common notions with Allan that necessitates her drawing these ideas directly together as ‘ oh he still loves me’. And this is the case even in a hypothetical case where an entire nature is shared. It might utterly shared – and yet it still can pose itself within that sharing (and thinks merely in terms of a constant unwinding of yet new notions)

Each of these three problems essentially resolves around the problem how the two aspects of the common notions of the unknown relate to one another. The first might the be characterized as the problem a specific common notion faces it get caught in the great unknown of the general notion – that is the infinite immediate mode itself. The Third then makes the opposite move, and involves a very problematic way in which the known of the general notion – the adequately perceived mind, attempts to manifest itself within the selfless world of the specific notion. The second problem what is problematic is essential the misfit between the ways that the general and specific notions proceed. A Specific is always developing in a context- while the very premise of the general is that not such development can be absolute, and it therefore limited.

One might say across all of these three problems- the three antinomies of the unknown-  lurks the surprise. It is after all Caddy’s domain to set up affect in the infinite immediate mode and then arrange these affects across the whole order of nature . Allan problem then is that he cannot make Caddy’s  initial jump, and relativise creation (by 5/1)  - for him what matters is the unknown itself, and so he is caught, creating two principles he cannot then move between: Before I conclude this essay I will then very briefly consider an example from Bleak House of each Antinomy.

The Antinomy of The encounter,

How does the infinite haunt the specific?  And how does this haunting form an antinomy? In 2/43 Spinoza argues that the mind has an idea of itself as it forms adequate ideas. However the double headed nature of common notions make the status of this complex. If one is forming, what I have called above a specific common notions, then the adequate idea one forms of the mind as a part of the expression of this notion, is only defined within the context of what that notions is, and how it necessarily involves the mind.  However the situation rather different as one forms a perception of the mind from more general common notions. I argued above that what was special about general common notions (idea of motion and rest, or the attribute) was that they gave the mind a way to perceive itself in terms of what is always adequate within it (as long as it exists).  From which it follows (by 2/43), that the mind is certainly be able to have a generalized consciousness of conscious of itself.  However such a generalized consciousness comes at a cost. In 2/38 – The mind, Spinoza argues, is comprised of affects that necessarily involve both ones own body, and external bodies.  From which it follows a mind that understands itself through motion and rest, understands itself adequately. And yet by the same logic, the mind does not comprehend fully either its own body or external bodies, as all it adequately grasps adequately, is the way it is affected by them.  And yet it is just such a gap between perception and reality that Spinoza argued what so problematic at the end of part 3 of ethics. It is then worth working backwards through some of the argument. In 3/58 Spinoza makes just this argument. The mind will , he says as has any or desire – no matter how inadequate, also form an adequate idea of these affects (he makes same move in 5/4s). However what exactly is in this adequate idea depends upon the common notions which informed it (Spinoza therefore cites  2/43 and 2/40S2 in his proof). If then this idea relates to a rich specific common notion,  that is all well and good; However given the chances in the world, it is more likely that any such adequate idea is very general in nature-  and therefore grasps not things as they are in themselves, but rather the way that they affect me. It is then very easy to imagine 3/58 – leading to 3/53. In this latter proposition Spinoza argues that when the mind considers itself and its power of acting it rejoices. He based his proof of this proposition upon 2/19, that is, on the fact that the mind knows itself only through its affections, and only as those affection posits that minds existence. The mind therefore knows itself (in terms of 2/38) as certain way the world in changing: what is more this way of changing only grasps other entities adequately as they embody a change for it. From which it follows there is no reason why the change others enable needs to be real. On the contrary Spinoza (in the corollary to 3/53) says one can easily imagine that this change is imaginary. This imaginary status will not of course stop the joy (that is the increase of power) being real, and therefore not be directly occluded by an adequate idea one form of oneself in terms of ones affects.

   The upshot of the all this is it is very easy to understand how an adequate idea –based upon a general common notions might interrupt the formation of a more specific common notion, and do so even as one adequately perceived ones own nature (as a certain affect).  Such a general common notion only perceives affects, and (via 3/58-53) privileges one affection (that of the mind) over all others. Humans will then still be in a situation where they judge the world according to their own position in it – and do so even as they form an adequate set of ideas about it.  From which it follows, that humans, as they engage with other with common notions, are very vulnerable to the surprise. That is, they are vulnerable to something from the outside that breaks into there current (specific) set of common notions, and which even as they reason, forces them back upon more general common notions. Such a move, will then drive the reasoning mind away from engaging with other things as they are in themselves, and into engaging with solely with affects. Or to put it another way, reason is very much like Allan, in Tom-all-Alone encountering Jo (537-540). A surprise, that threatens to jolt him out of a specific encounter (with a ill child), and into an encounter with an affect. A move that is then all the more profoundly unjust in that the affect involved (revulsion at the idea that Jo infected Esther) never belonged to Jo at all  but was merely a certain relationship of motion and rest (a disease) that Jo carried. One might then say, Allan’s anger, through which of course he is asserting his own existence (his own desire for Esther), is not then with a human at all – but rather in impersonal affect (an illness). Here Allan is facing up to the problem of possibly every romantic Hero . A Hero can only assert his own rights as he is a privileged affect (a will) within the world of other affects – and so as be abandons understanding the world through other gentler more specific common notions. It is of course to Allan credit that he fights against this position, and creates with Jo an altogether more productive common notion.

The Antinomy of The Occluded Occasion:

The first antinomy revolves around what happens if one perceptions suddenly dissolve into affects – which allow oneself to be adequate present, but not other; The second antinomy then raises very much the opposite problem, What would happen, it asks if one only made specific common notions – and where not able to take those notions up into a more general one – though which ones own rights of existence was posited?  Here the relevant passage in Spinoza comes towards  the end of part four. In 4/52 Spinoza argues not only that self esteem is compatible with Reason, and  but also (4/52 S) it is the highest things one can hope for. What is then interesting is his proof for this proposition rests upon 3/3 and 3/3 in turn rests upon 2/38: Spinoza therefore argues that one can form adequate ideas of the parts of ones mind as they (and through them oneself) exist within the most general of common notions. From which is of course follows that one can only have an idea of oneself (and have the esteem associated with that idea) as one actually forms general, not specific common notions. It therefore follows that self- esteem (for reasons considered above) can easily slip into pride, if this affect is allowed to divorce itself from the world of things ( 3/ appen Def XXV-XXVIII). However (and in the course of his discussion on pride) Spinoza opens up another possibility. He claims a human will think less highly of himself that is just , if ‘in the present he denies something of himself in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain – for example he denies that he conceives anything certain, or that he can desire or do anything dishonourable’. Spinoza calls this move despondency. What it then comes down to is that it is possible to divorce the two ways the mind understands itself. In the present I might well be engaged reasonably with the world of specific common notions. But this does not me thinking of ‘another’ self, who is defined in the immediate mode, and who cannot of itself either justify its own ‘truths’, or even guarantee (across all of itself) the ethical nature of its judgements.

  This split is then inherent to reason itself, and it is as dangerous to glorify the specific common notions over the general and visa versa, and Esther’s mindset always risks falling into doing so. (704) Here one needs care. It s not that Esther does not have a notion of the self (she could hardly have adequate ideas without it). It is just that her very methodology for forming common notions involves never pulling out a separate conception of herself, but is rather always reaching out to and engaging with others. She is therefore (rightly enough) suspicious of a self that not only might claim the credit for these links with others, but also as it claimed all affect for its own) would actively prevent her from forming common notions. Moreover, it might  even risk polluting her relationship with Allan itself, which was itself based on a perpetually development of new facets. Reason therefore – without external intervention remains divided from itself.

The mutual limit.

Behind both the previous antinomies lies a problem of procedure. Reason as it occurs in 2/38 and 39 simply does not need to be compatible with itself, as the way one gives oneself within specific bonds one forms with others-  and the way one attempt to think ones own (and every else’s) existence are by no means compatible with one another. For how could a sense of a sense that is born within an encounter simply equal the self which is true for all encounter ? Spinoza of course solves this problem through a surprise that is able to re-orientate itself upon God.  It is therefore the surprise that understands how to make ones own (personal)_ affects resonate across the most general of common notions, while at the same time it  detaches these same affect from any cause, and launches them into necessity, and through necessity to God. What if such a surprise is not possible? What if one cannot make, for whatever reason, the jump into seeing common notion in terms of internal reality What is teach form of reason remains cut of from one another : What is one is like Allan, who thinks of his presence in Yorkshire both in terms of being a tragic hero, and a part of his common bond with Esther (he accepts the post in his grief as a sacred trust).  If one cannot then make the Caddy jump to God, one need then quite a different reason – in effect one needs a Jardyce, whom in his very inability to think reason properly (that is make common notion) can straddle this divide, and become a launch a suroagte – and unlooked for surprise (724).

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